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Abstract
Internet-based multimedia applications (e.g., voice-over-IP, instant messaging, and video conferenc-
ing) are continuing to grow in importance as more people depend on such applications for personal
and professional communications. Although performance is almost always a concern with multime-
dia systems that must satisfy quality-of-service (QoS) constraints, security is also a major require-
ment given the increasing criticality of such applications. For example, businesses might depend
on Internet telephony to reach customers while governments might depend on video streaming to
disseminate information. For distributed multimedia services, in addition to the traditional security
properties (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), accountability is also important to comple-
ment perimeter defenses. Accounting for user actions within the system enables the development of
higher-level security services.
This dissertation will present the Kantoku framework, which includes several different accounting
mechanisms for different environments ranging from single servers to server clusters to computing
clouds. Our framework focuses on distributed multimedia services deployed in such environments.
In particular, we will show how our Kantoku framework can be used to address the problem of
transaction state overload on multimedia servers.
The primary attack that we consider throughout this dissertation is a novel denial-of-service
attack that intentionally induces transaction state overload at multimedia servers. We refer to this
attack as a Ringing-based denial-of-service attack. Unlike many denial-of-service attacks that rely
on an increase in the incoming traffic rate, a Ringing-based denial-of-service attack only requires an
increase in the transaction durations while the incoming traffic rate does not change. Such attacks
cannot be detected by protection mechanisms that monitor the network traffic for anomalies. After
briefly explaining some background information on the Session Initiation Protocol, we characterize
transaction state accumulation during a Ringing-based denial-of-service attack both mathematically
and empirically through extensive experiments.
The first solution to preventing transaction state overload that we present is a family of early
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termination algorithms that selectively terminate transactions suspected of causing transaction state
overload in multimedia servers. This protection mechanism relies on per-transaction accounting at
a single server. The three algorithms that we developed are thoroughly evaluated in the context of
Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks with experiments on a local testbed.
As an alternative to early termination, we also developed two admission control algorithms that
selectively reject transaction requests from users suspected of consuming more than their fair share
of transaction resources among a group of multimedia servers. This protection mechanism relies on
per-client accounting across a cluster of multimedia servers. The two algorithms that we developed
are thoroughly evaluated in the context of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks with experiments
on a local testbed.
For service-oriented environments, we developed a distributed accounting architecture to imple-
ment accountability for distributed multimedia services. Specifically, our accounting architecture
considers per-client monitoring for accounting across a potentially large number of nodes that are
geographically distributed across a wide area network. Using the distributed accounting architec-
ture, we built a reputation-based trust management framework that allows distributed multimedia
services to share and retrieve relevant trust information that can be applied to their server-side
access control decisions in a customized fashion. We briefly explain how the Ringing-based denial-
of-service attack problem can be reduced to a reputation-based trust management problem. We also
evaluate the performance of the implementation of our trust management framework both in terms
of throughput and latency.
This dissertation makes contributions in three major areas. The first area is the introduction and
detailed analysis of the Ringing-based denial-of-service attack, which is a type of malicious trans-
action state overload that targets multimedia servers running the Session Initiation Protocol. The
second area includes early termination and admission control algorithms for specifically mitigating
the effects of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks. The final area includes our distributed ac-
counting architecture and the reputation-based trust management system that uses this accounting
architecture. Although our accounting architecture and reputation-based trust management system
are applicable to many general problems related to accountability, we consider how they can be
applied to the problem of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the continuing emergence of Internet-based multimedia, more people now depend on dis-
tributed multimedia services for everyday applications. Some example applications include voice-
over-IP, video conferencing, instant messaging, and video-on-demand. End users enjoy these appli-
cations on a wide variety of devices ranging from HDTVs to desktop computers to laptop computers
to mobile phones. In fact, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has designed the IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for deploying Internet-based multimedia services in modern cellular
networks [14]. Although end users might only see a single interface to these applications, these
services often comprise several distributed nodes that collectively provide the overall functionality.
Due to our growing dependence on these applications, security is a major requirement as new
multimedia services continue to be deployed. Although the traditional CIA properties (confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability) are integral to security (especially at the perimeter of the system),
another important security attribute that must be maintained to bolster defenses is accountability.
In general, accountability means that users can be held responsible for their interactions with the
system [70]. Higher-level security services can be implemented on top of accountability mechanisms.
For example, some operating systems utilize audit logs to achieve accountability. Such logs can then
be used online for intrusion detection or oﬄine for forensic analysis.
Although accountability is crucial to system security, maintaining accountability to implement
higher-level security services presents many challenges in distributed environments hosting multi-
media services. The first challenge is scalability with respect to both the potentially large number
of concurrent user sessions that must be handled simultaneously as well as the size of the multi-
media service infrastructure itself. As the popularity of a multimedia service increases, then the
accountability mechanism will be responsible for managing more accounting information associated
with the larger number of users and their corresponding actions within the system. As the number
of nodes in the multimedia service infrastructure increases, then the accountability mechanism is
responsible for collecting and disseminating accounting information between a larger number of mul-
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timedia servers. Another challenge is that the accountability mechanisms should not significantly
degrade the performance of the underlying multimedia applications, which are often sensitive to
meeting quality-of-service (QoS) constraints, while still providing highly accurate accounting infor-
mation for higher-level security services. A related challenge is that higher-level security services
should improve the overall experience of legitimate users of the system without introducing more
problems for legitimate users. For example, a higher-level security service that denies access to users
suspected of misbehaving should have minimal false positives. One final challenge is that integrat-
ing accountability into the underlying distributed multimedia service should be either completely
transparent or provide a simple programming interface to application developers, who might not be
familiar with secure programming techniques.
Our Kantoku framework, which is the subject of our research, focuses on meeting the above chal-
lenges concerning accountability in distributed multimedia services. Our accountability mechanisms
enable the enforcement of system-wide policies. Specifically, we show how the Kantoku framework
can be applied to the problem of mitigating transaction state overload to enhance availability in the
following environments: (1) individual multimedia servers, (2) multimedia server clusters, and (3)
multimedia service-oriented environments.
1.1 Motivation
Before continuing to describe the Kantoku framework, we will briefly cover the applications that we
consider as well as the motivation of our framework.
1.1.1 Target Applications
The Kantoku framework is designed for distributed multimedia services (e.g., voice-over-IP, video-
on-demand streaming, IPTV), which are typically session-oriented. Most distributed multimedia
services are implemented with protocols that typically fall into two major categories: (1) control
and management plane, and (2) data plane. The Kantoku framework operates in the control and
management plane by managing accounting information extracted from monitoring messages asso-
ciated with control and management protocols. These control and management messages are used
in the Kantoku framework to characterize client behavior for accountability. For our purposes, ac-
countability is defined as holding clients responsible for their actions with respect to the following
operations: (1) session creation, (2) session modification, and (3) session termination. By hold-
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Figure 1.1: Taxonomy of Target Applications
ing clients responsible for their session operations, we can implement higher-level services, such as
transaction state overload mitigation. Specifically, we focus on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
during our performance evaluations. SIP can be used for signaling in a wide variety of multimedia
applications (e.g., voice-over-IP, IPTV, and instant messaging) [56, 32]. A taxonomy of our target
applications appears in Figure 1.1.
1.1.2 Inadequacy of Perimeter Defenses
Many systems focus their security efforts at the perimeter of the system. Operating systems, for
example, often employ access control lists or capabilities list to restrict the access of subjects (e.g.,
users) to particular objects (e.g., files). Some Web servers request passwords to authenticate clients
before granting access to confidential HTML pages. Enterprises often use firewalls to protect their
networks by restricting external access to their corporate intranets.
Although perimeter security is necessary as a first line of defense, it is often inadequate. For
example, a disgruntled employee with authorized access might intentionally disable enterprise servers
with an insider attack on the system. Another possibility is that an employee with authorized access
might unknowingly do harm to servers on an enterprise network from a compromised machine. The
proliferation of botnets comprising thousands of zombies on the Internet has provided plenty of
evidence of the large number of vulnerable machines being compromised.
Since perimeter security is not sufficient for many systems, accountability is necessary to com-
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plement perimeter defenses. Session management to obtain accounting information on all clients
accessing the system regardless of their authorization is a useful mechanism to enhance account-
ability. The collected information on client behavior can be used to enforce system policies or build
other higher-layer security services.
1.2 Background and State of the Art
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, our Kantoku framework enables the management of
accountability information in distributed multimedia services. Using this accountability information,
we apply the Kantoku framework to the specific problem of mitigating transaction state overload
(which is a type of denial-of-service attack) in multimedia servers and reputation-based trust man-
agement for service-oriented environments. Much previous work has been done on accountability in
general distributed systems as well as the specific problems of preventing denial-of-service attacks
and implementing reputation-based trust management.
Many solutions have been proposed for maintaining accountability in distributed systems. Both
centralized and decentralized approaches have been developed for resource usage accounting to
enable fair resource allocation in the PlanetLab network testbed [16, 27]. Also, due to the free-
riding problem of participants consuming resources without contributing anything in return, many
peer-to-peer systems incorporate some type of accountability maintenance [17, 64, 46, 50, 44]. Using
accountability information to detect faulty or malicious nodes that deviate from a given protocol
has also been considered [31]. Unlike existing approaches, the Kantoku framework addresses the
problem of maintaining accountability in the control and management plane for session-oriented
multimedia applications in order to provide higher-level security services.
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have plagued the Internet for quite some time and will continue
to cause problems for the foreseeable future. Many researchers have considered the prevention of IP
spoofing and/or packet flooding attacks at the network layer [48, 51, 35, 66, 37] as well as request
flooding attacks at the application layer [22, 41, 65]. In addition to flooding-based attacks, some
previous work has also considered the exploitation of application-layer semantics for Web servers
[62]. Unlike existing approaches to combating DoS attacks, our Kantoku framework specifically
considers malicious transaction state overload, which is a type of application-layer denial-of-service
attack on multimedia servers.
Reputation-based trust management is a trust management alternative when credential-based
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trust management is not practical. Essentially, clients and servers evaluate each other based on
their previous transaction histories obtained either directly from firsthand observations or indirectly
from the feedback of others. Reputation-based trust management systems have been developed for
online auctions [2], Web service selection [72, 39, 52], and peer-to-peer systems [21, 40, 68]. Many of
these systems assume a single reputation metric for a single application. Unlike existing approaches
to reputation-based trust management, our Kantoku framework enables multiple service types to
apply their own custom reputation metrics in the same reputation system over the same feedback
data.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
This thesis will show that our Kantoku framework, which utilizes session management for account-
ability, can effectively complement traditional perimeter defenses to enhance security in distributed
multimedia services, especially for higher-level security services that require policy enforcement.
Specifically, we show that the Kantoku framework can be used for transaction state overload miti-
gation and reputation-based trust management for distributed multimedia services. Accountability
is an important attribute when we consider the enforcement of system-wide policies for distributed
multimedia services. By sharing information on locally observed client behavior, the multimedia
servers can cooperatively enforce policies to hold clients responsible for their actions in the entire
system. Our specific contributions are listed below. A high-level overview of our layered Kantoku
framework is shown in Figure 1.2
1. Analysis of novel Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks that cause transaction state overload.
2. Early termination algorithms to mitigate malicious transaction state overload on single server.
3. Admission control algorithms to mitigate malicious transaction state overload on server cluster.
4. Distributed accounting architecture that enhances accountability in distributed multimedia
services.
5. Reputation-based trust management framework for service-oriented environments.
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Policy Enforcement
Accounting
Session Monitoring
Figure 1.2: Kantoku Framework
1.4 Thesis Outline
In the next few chapters, we will present the major components of the Kantoku framework. A
roadmap of the Kantoku framework with a detailed view of its components in relation to thesis
chapters is shown in Figure 1.3. For necessary background information, Chapter 2 briefly reviews
some relevant aspects of the Session Initiation Protocol to the systems discussed in this thesis.
Next, we introduce and analyze a novel attack that causes transaction state overload in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 will present three algorithms to mitigate transaction state overload on a single multimedia
server. Chapter 5 will investigate the problem of transaction state overload for a multimedia server
cluster and present two algorithms to mitigate transaction state overload. Chapter 6 will describe
our distributed accounting architecture, which is the foundation upon which we can enforce policies
for distributed multimedia services. After presenting our distributed accounting architecture, we
describe the problem of trust management and build a reputation-based trust management system
on top of our distributed accounting architecture in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 reviews the related work
and we finally present our conclusions and future work in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Session Initiation
Protocol
In this chapter, we present some necessary background information on the Session Initiation Proto-
col, which will be used by all of the systems discussed throughout this thesis. The Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) is an application-layer signaling protocol for session creation and management [56].
SIP supports multiple underlying transport-layer protocols, such as TCP and UDP. Sessions man-
aged with SIP are typically associated with applications requiring real-time communication, such as
Internet telephony or instant messaging. Internet telephony, which is also referred to as Voice-over-
IP (VoIP), continues to emerge as a feasible option to replace traditional telephone systems that
use the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). In comparison to PSTN-based systems, VoIP
allows packet-switched data networks to be utilized for telephony and is more easily integrated with
Internet-based services, such as e-mail or Web browsing.
In addition to its use by many Internet telephony service providers (e.g., Vonage [11]), SIP
is also incorporated into the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) architecture defined by 3GPP [14,
49]. The IMS architecture facilitates the delivery of Internet-based multimedia to mobile users by
telecommunications service providers (e.g., cellular phone service).
As SIP continues to play a larger role in our global telecommunications infrastructure, it will
be critically important to secure SIP-based infrastructures from disruptive attacks. For example,
a group of attackers might be hired by a competitor of some company X to disable company X’s
VoIP-based telephone system through an attack on their SIP servers. A similar attack on Web
servers owned by different companies from a malicious competitor has previously been reported
[53]. Attacks on governmental Web servers have also been reported [43].
As VoIP systems continue to be deployed within enterprises, it is not unreasonable to assume
that attackers will target SIP servers in the same way that Web servers are currently targeted.
Therefore, the protection of SIP-based infrastructures will be required to ensure the availability of
critical telecommunication services for the enterprise. In the remaining chapters of this thesis, we
will discuss specific attacks on SIP-based infrastructures as well as the corresponding protection
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Request Description
ACK acknowledges receipt of final response to INVITE
BYE session termination
CANCEL cancel previous request
INVITE session establishment
OPTIONS query capabilities of server
REGISTER register user contact information
Table 2.1: SIP Request Methods
mechanisms that we propose.
2.1 Entities
The SIP specification defines several logical entities involved in session management [56]. For ex-
ample, a registrar server is responsible for processing registration requests that map an individual
SIP URI to a current network location. In this thesis, we will focus primarily on the following three
logical SIP entities: user agent client, user agent server, and intermediate proxy server.
The user agent client (UAC) initiates session requests intended for a user agent server (UAS).
In terms of traditional telephony, the UAC is analogous to the caller and the UAS is analogous
to the callee. Many user agent implementations (e.g., SIP software phones) run both the client
and server sides simultaneously. SIP proxy servers are responsible for routing session requests to
their ultimate destinations. A session request originating from a UAC might traverse zero or more
intermediate proxy servers before reaching the UAS. SIP routing at the last proxy in the request
path often involves the use of a location service that uses registration information to lookup the
current network location (i.e., IP address) of the UAS.
2.2 Methods
The SIP specification also defines several request methods [56]. The six basic SIP request method
names appear in Table 2.1 along with a brief description. In addition to the basic methods, SIP has
defined several request method extensions. The details for the SIP request method name extensions
can be found in RFC 3261 [56]. Our basic SIP call scenario described in Section 2.3 only involves
the following SIP request methods: INVITE, ACK, and BYE.
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2.3 Call Scenario
In Figure 2.1, the UAC (i.e., caller) requests the initiation of a communication session with the
UAS (i.e., callee) by sending an INVITE request via the proxy 1. Upon receiving the INVITE at
the proxy, the proxy will first send a 100 Trying provisional response to the UAC to prevent
unnecessary retransmissions of the INVITE request. Next, the proxy will forward the INVITE to
the UAS. Upon receiving the INVITE at the UAS, the UAS will immediately send a 180 Ringing
provisional response to the UAC via the proxy. Similar to a telephone, the UAS is now in the
ringing state. Once the UAS picks up the call, it sends a 200 OK final response to the UAC via
the proxy. The UAC will acknowledge reception of the 200 OK final response with an ACK request.
An interactive communication session has now been established between the UAC and UAS, which
allows them to communicate directly.
As also shown in Figure 2.1, an established session can be terminated when either the UAC or
UAS sends a BYE request to the other party. The other party will then acknowledge reception of
the BYE request by responding with a 200 OK final response. The ACK request is only used during
session establishment since there could potentially be a significant delay between the UAS entering
the ringing state and the UAS sending the final response to the UAC.
In Figure 2.1, the proxy in this basic call scenario can be thought of as a server that handles
all incoming calls for the UAS. For example, a company using VoIP might issue logical SIP URIs
to its employees (e.g., sip:alice@company.com). However, since employees might be at different
locations 2 throughout the day, it will be necessary to map the logical SIP URIs to actual contact
IP addresses (e.g., sip:alice@128.174.254.29) when an incoming call is received. In conjunction
with a registrar and location service, the company can use SIP proxies to route incoming INVITE
requests to the UAS at its current location.
2.4 Transaction State Maintenance
For the purpose of understanding the systems described in this thesis, it is important to distinguish
between stateless and stateful proxies, which are both defined in RFC 3261 [56]. A stateless proxy
simply forwards messages based only on the message header parameters without maintaining any
transaction context. A stateful proxy will maintain transaction state for request processing. A
SIP transaction corresponds to a single session operation (e.g., session establishment or session
1Proxy and proxy server will be used interchangeably.
2Example locations could possibly include a desktop computer at the office or a laptop computer at home.
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(b) Session Termination
Media
ACK ACK
Figure 2.1: Call Establishment and Termination
termination). Transactions should not be confused with entire sessions, which typically last longer.
Similarly, a transaction stateful proxy (which is our focus) that maintains transaction state for a
session operation should not be confused with a call stateful proxy that maintains call state for an
entire session. Call stateful proxy servers are also transaction stateful according to RFC 3261 [56].
For each transaction, the intermediate stateful proxy will maintain a server transaction state
machine for the upstream UAC and a client transaction state machine for the downstream UAS. The
transaction state machines are responsible for the following: event timers, message retransmissions,
filtering duplicates, and correlating responses to previous requests. The relevant parts of the client
transaction state machine for the proxy in our basic call scenario described in Section 2.3 are shown
in Figure 2.2. Upon receiving an INVITE request, a stateful proxy will create a client transaction
state machine initially in the calling state. If the stateful proxy receives a final response immediately
while in the calling state, then it will enter the terminated state. In the terminated state, client
transaction state resources can be released. If the stateful proxy receives a provisional response
(e.g., 180 Ringing) while in the calling state, then it will enter the proceeding state. If the stateful
proxy receives a final response while in the proceeding state, then it will enter the terminated state.
In Figure 2.2, Timer A is used to control request retransmissions when an unreliable transport, such
as UDP, is used. Timers B and C are used for transaction timeouts in the calling or proceeding
state, respectively. In particular, Timer C allows three minutes between responses.
Similarly, the relevant parts of the server transaction state machine for the proxy in our basic call
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Calling Terminated
Event: Receive INVITE
Action: Forward INVITE
Event: Timer A Fires
Actions: Reset Timer A
and Retransmit INVITE
Event: Receive 1xx
Event: Receive 1xx
Event: Receive 2xx
Event: Timer B Fires
Figure 2.2: Client Transaction State Machine
scenario are shown in Figure 2.3. Upon receiving an INVITE request, a stateful proxy will also create
a server transaction state machine initially in the proceeding state. In our basic call scenario shown
in Figure 2.1, the server transaction state machine can only transition to the terminated state as a
result of events received by the corresponding client transaction state machine. Specifically, a final
response or transaction timeout allow the server transaction state machine to reach the terminated
state.
In our basic call scenario shown in Figure 2.1, the stateful proxy will create transaction state
when it receives the INVITE or BYE request. The proxy will release the resources associated with
that transaction when it forwards the 200 OK final response from the UAS to the UAC. Specifically,
Figure 2.4 shows the duration of transaction state maintenance for session establishment.
One reason for using a stateful proxy rather than a stateless proxy is to enable the deployment
of richer functionality within the proxy. For example, a user agent U might register multiple contact
IP addresses for its single logical SIP URI. When a stateful proxy receives an INVITE request for U,
it can fork that request by forwarding the INVITE request to all of the registered contact addresses
for U in parallel. When U picks up the call at one contact address, the stateful proxy can then
send a CANCEL request to the other contact addresses where U did not pick up the call. Stateless
proxies cannot support this forking behavior since they do not maintain any transaction context.
Furthermore, RFC 3261 specifically states that requests forwarded to more than one location must
be handled statefully [56].
12
Proceeding Terminated
Event: Receive INVITE
Action: Send 100
Event: Receive 2xx, Action: Forward 2xx
Event: Timer C Fires, Action: Send 5xx
Event: Receive INVITE, Action: Send 100
Event: Receive 101-199, Action: Forward 101-199
Figure 2.3: Server Transaction State Machine
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Figure 2.4: Duration of Transaction State Maintenance
13
Chapter 3
Ringing-based Denial-of-Service
Attacks
Throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis, we will consider a type of novel attack on stateful
SIP proxy servers called the Ringing-based denial-of-service attack. In the following section, we
will describe the details of this attack and how it can potentially lead to transaction state overload
at a SIP proxy server. In Section 3.2, we quantify the potential increase in transaction state caused
by Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks. Finally, in Section 3.3, we measure the actual increase
in transaction state and corresponding resource usage caused by Ringing-based denial-of-service
attacks.
3.1 Transaction State Overload
In contrast to stateless HTTP servers, multimedia servers responsible for control signaling are of-
ten stateful. The session-oriented nature of multimedia communications often requires servers to
maintain transaction state during one or more of the following session operations: (1) session estab-
lishment, (2) session modification, and (3) session termination. For example, Real Time Streaming
Protocol (RTSP) servers maintain state from session establishment (i.e., receipt of SETUP request,
which allocates resources for the media stream) through session termination (i.e., receipt of TEARDOWN
request, which frees resources for the media stream) [58]. H.323 gatekeepers, which provide circuit-
switched call signaling for the ISDN Q.931 protocol, must also maintain state for the entire duration
of a call [59]. Stateful SIP proxy servers maintain transaction state between requests (e.g., INVITE)
and final responses (e.g., 200 OK).
The basic idea of the Ringing-based denial-of-service (DoS) attack is to induce transaction state
overload in a SIP proxy server by deliberately increasing the duration of transactions for session
establishment. Essentially, user agents keep the SIP proxy server in the proceeding state from
Figure 2.2 much longer than usual. The proceeding state at the SIP proxy server in our basic call
scenario depicted in Figure 2.1 corresponds to the device ringing at the UAS. Since SIP allows
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three minutes between responses, a UAS could potentially wait that long between sending a 180
Ringing provisional response to an INVITE request and the corresponding 200 OK final response.
Unlike protocols that do not involve direct human intervention in the loop (e.g., TCP), the timing
of requests and responses from multimedia clients can be highly variable because they correspond
to real human actions. In session establishment for SIP, this human action would correspond to
answering a ringing device. This variation makes it difficult to determine appropriate timeout
values to release transaction state.
It is important to note that Ringing-based DoS attacks on stateful proxies do not rely on traffic
flooding or deviations from the SIP protocol defined in [56]. In our attack model, malicious or
compromised user agents exploit the semantics of the SIP protocol by intentionally increasing the
amount of transaction state that must be maintained by a stateful proxy. As shown in Figure 2.4, a
stateful proxy must maintain transaction context from the time it receives an INVITE request from
the UAC (i.e., incoming call from caller) until it forwards the 200 OK final response from the UAS to
the UAC (i.e., call pickup at the callee). A stateful proxy with limited resources can only maintain
a finite amount of transaction state before service disruptions start to occur.
A UAS purposely staying in the ringing state for an unusually long amount of time before picking
up the incoming call will be referred to as an excessively ringing UAS. If one or more UACs repeatedly
send INVITE requests (even at a relatively low traffic rate) to one or more excessively ringing UASs
located behind a particular SIP proxy, then that stateful proxy can potentially become the target
of a Ringing-based DoS attack, which we named after the 180 Ringing provisional response that
indicates the UAS is in the ringing state.
In a Ringing-based DoS attack, excessively ringing UASs consume resources at the stateful proxy
for a longer period of time, which makes these resources unavailable for other incoming calls. As
we will show in our analysis in Section 3.2 and experimental results in Section 3.3, even a relatively
low rate of incoming calls to excessively ringing UASs can significantly increase the amount of
transaction state that must be maintained at a SIP proxy.
Many possibilities exist for a user agent to become a willing or unwilling participant in a Ringing-
based DoS attack. First, attacking UACs might collude with disgruntled insiders within an enterprise
that willingly act as excessively ringing UASs. Second, attacking UACs might automatically scan a
list of SIP URIs to detect unresponsive callees. These unresponsive callees might unwillingly become
excessively ringing UASs during an attack since they will not pick up the incoming calls from the
attacking UACs. Lastly, attacking UACs might utilize a botnet located behind a target SIP proxy
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Term Definition
NumTrans expected long-term average number of active transactions
CallRateoverall overall incoming call rate (in calls per second)
CallRateb incoming call rate (in calls per second) from benign user agents
CallRatem incoming call rate (in calls per second) from malicious user agents
PickupT imeoverall average call pickup time (in seconds)
PickupT imeb average call pickup time (in seconds) from benign user agents
PickupT imem average call pickup time (in seconds) from malicious user agents
Ben PickupT imeb in Figure 3.1
Mal PickupT imem in Figure 3.1
Table 3.1: Definition of Terms
to act as excessively ringing UASs. In the Web application domain, such botnets have previously
been rented to disrupt online businesses [41]. Evidence of using VoIP networks to build botnets has
already been reported [34].
3.2 Analysis
Using Little’s law, we can analyze the expected amount of transaction state in the system [47].
According to Little’s law, if given a long-term average incoming call rate CallRateoverall and an
expected average call pickup time PickupT imeoverall, then we can compute the expected long-term
average number of active INVITE transactions NumTrans for a system comprising one or more
SIP proxy servers as shown in Equation 3.1. Furthermore, Little’s law also allows us to compute
the expected long-term average even if we have two distinct workloads. For example, Equation
3.2 shows the expected long-term average number of active INVITE transactions NumTrans given
average call rate CallRateb and average call pickup time PickupT imeb for benign user agents as
well as average call rate CallRatem and average call pickup time PickupT imem for malicious user
agents. A summary of the terms used in this section appear in Table 3.1 for easy reference.
NumTrans = CallRateoverall · PickupT imeoverall (3.1)
NumTrans = CallRateb · PickupT imeb + CallRatem · PickupT imem (3.2)
Equation 3.2 confirms our intuitive understanding of the effects of Ringing-based DoS attacks.
If we only increase the expected malicious pickup time PickupT imem without changing the other
parameters, then the expected number of transactions NumTrans in the system will increase.
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Figure 3.1: Expected Long-Term Average Number of Active Transactions
Therefore, Ringing-based DoS attacks can increase the transaction state at a SIP proxy without
increasing the incoming call traffic rates.
In Figure 3.1, we show how the expected number of active INVITE transactions in the system
varies as we increase the fraction of malicious calls. The aggregate traffic rate was 100 calls per
second (i.e., CallRateb + CallRatem = 100). We consider two different benign call pickup times in
the figure. In the first case, the expected benign call pickup time Ben is 8 seconds. In the second
case, the expected benign call pickup time Ben is 23 seconds. In both cases, the expected malicious
call pickup times Mal were 75 seconds. As shown for the case when Ben = 8 seconds in Figure 3.1,
if only 5% of the calls are malicious, then the expected amount of transaction state in the system
increases by over 40%. For the case when Ben = 23 seconds, if only 10% of the calls are malicious,
then the expected amount of transaction state in the system increases by over 20%.
As shown in Figure 3.1, even a slight increase in the amount of traffic that uses longer call
pickup times can significantly increase the amount of transaction state that must be maintained
in the system by the SIP proxy servers. If we are given the SIP proxy server transaction capacity
Capacity, then we can use Equation 3.2 to derive the minimum malicious incoming call rate required
to cause transaction state overload, which appears in Equation 3.3.
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NumTrans > Capacity
CallRateb · PickupT imeb + CallRatem · PickupT imem > Capacity
CallRatem · PickupT imem > Capacity − CallRateb · PickupT imeb
CallRatem >
Capacity − CallRateb · PickupT imeb
PickupT imem
(3.3)
As shown in Equation 3.1, in order to obtain accurate estimates on the expected long-term
average number of transactions in the system for a given incoming call rate, it is necessary to know
the expected call pickup times if we want to apply Little’s law. Although we do not have access to
recent data for call pickup time distributions, Duffy and Mercer reported an average ringing time
of 8.5 seconds with standard deviation of 7.2 seconds for answered phone calls [25]. Their study,
which collected data in October 1974 from the Bell System, also reported an average ringing time
of 38.1 seconds with standard deviation of 20.7 seconds for unanswered phone calls. It is difficult
to know the applicability of these numbers to current telephony workloads due to the emergence of
answering machines, cellular phones, and voicemail since their study was conducted.
3.3 Performance Evaluation
In order to determine how the underlying system resource usage relates to the current transac-
tion state in the system, we implemented a stateful JAIN SIP proxy server with additional code
to periodically retrieve system resource usage information [7]. The particular resources that we
monitored were the following: (1) number of active INVITE transactions in the system, (2) memory
usage, and (3) cumulative processing time. User agent traffic for our experiments was generated by
the open source SIPp performance testing tool, which is often used to evaluate SIP proxy server
implementations [10].
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup consisted of three machines connected over a local area network. One ma-
chine ran all of the emulated SIPp UACs (i.e., callers) that sent all of the INVITE) requests. Another
18
machine ran all of the emulated SIPp UASs (i.e., callees) that received the INVITE requests. The
last machine ran our implementation of a stateful JAIN SIP proxy server, which took measurements
of system resource usage every 10 seconds during the experiments.
3.3.2 Workload Characteristics
We were able to control the incoming call rate from the UACs and call pickup times at the UASs
by adjusting the appropriate parameters in SIPp. For each experiment, we used SIPp to emulate
benign UACs calling benign UASs and malicious UACs calling malicious UASs. Since both benign
and malicious calls went through the same proxy in the experiments, we were able to measure the
combined effects of both types of UACs on resource usage at the SIP proxy server. We only ran
INVITE transactions for session establishment, which is the focus of our analysis of Ringing-based
DoS attacks.
We ran two different sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments, benign calls had ringing
times uniformly distributed between 1 and 15 seconds. In the second set of experiments, benign calls
had ringing times uniformly distributed between 1 and 45 seconds. For both sets of experiments,
we compared the resource usage in the system with both TCP and UDP used as the transport layer
protocols, which is allowed by the SIP standard [56]. For all of our experiments, malicious calls
had ringing times uniformly distributed between 30 and 120 seconds. According to RFC 3261, a
UAS has up to three minutes between responses (e.g., between sending a 180 Ringing provisional
response and a 200 OK final response), which means that the malicious calls in our experiments
do not violate the SIP specification, which is consistent with our attack model that assumes no
deviation by malicious user agents from the SIP protocol [56].
For most of our experiments, the aggregate incoming traffic rate at the SIP proxy was 100 calls
per second (cps) for a duration of three minutes. After the three minutes of new incoming calls, we
continued to observe the system until all calls had ended. For most of our experiments, the only
variable within each set of experiments was the fraction of the fixed aggregate incoming call traffic
rate originating from malicious UACs. The incoming call rate MR from the malicious UACs varied
between 0 and 50 cps. The incoming call rate BR from the benign UACs was always 100 cps minus
the incoming call rate from the malicious UACs in each experiment to maintain a fixed aggregate
call rate of 100 cps. Therefore, BR+MR = 100 cps in all of our experiments.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Active Transactions (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
3.3.3 Number of Active Transactions
The following figures show the amount of transaction state at the SIP proxy server as a function of
time. Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 all show the number of active transactions increasing
until that number reaches the approximate expected long-term average number of transactions.
All six figures also show the number of active transactions decreasing after the three-minute point
because no new incoming calls are made after 180 seconds.
Comparing Figure 3.2 with Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.3 with Figure 3.6 show that the choice of
transport layer protocol (i.e., TCP or UDP) does not affect the amount of transaction state in
the system. However, as we would expect based on Little’s law, the figures show that the amount
of transaction state increases as we increase the fraction of malicious calls, which have longer call
pickup times. We also see an increase in the amount of transaction state when the benign call pickup
time increases as well.
Compared to the other figures, Figures 3.4 and 3.7 show that simply increasing the rate of
benign calls for a higher aggregate call rate (without any malicious calls present) does not increase
the amount of transaction state nearly as much as maintaining the same aggregate call rate with an
increase in the fraction of malicious calls.
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Figure 3.3: Number of Active Transactions (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.4: Number of Active Transactions (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.5: Number of Active Transactions (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.6: Number of Active Transactions (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.7: Number of Active Transactions (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
3.3.4 Memory Usage
The following figures show the memory usage at the SIP proxy server as a function of time. Since
the JAIN SIP stack implementation uses the Java object-oriented programming language, we used
the heap size as an approximation of the memory used for data structures allocated for transaction
state maintenance [7, 8]. The heap is the runtime memory area used for the allocation of objects and
arrays. As the number of active transactions increases, we would expect the heap size to increase.
For all of the figures, the heap size generally follows the same pattern as the corresponding figures
for the number of active transactions in the system from Section 3.3.3. Similar to Section 3.3.3,
the amount of memory allocated for transaction state is higher as we either increase the fraction of
malicious calls or increase the benign call pickup times.
Unlike the number of active transactions, however, the transport layer protocol has a significant
impact on the heap size in the measurements. By comparing Figure 3.8 with Figure 3.11 and Figure
3.9 with Figure 3.12, we observe that the maximum heap size is over 40% higher when UDP is
used compared to when TCP is used for both sets of experiments. The additional requirements
for the SIP transaction state machines to provide TCP-like reliable message transmission (e.g.,
retransmission timers, filtering duplicates, etc.) when UDP is used as the underlying transport
protocol is responsible for the increased memory usage. Simpler transaction state machines are used
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Figure 3.8: Heap Size (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
by SIP when TCP is the underlying transport protocol.
Similar to the measurements for transaction state in Figures 3.4 and 3.7, Figures 3.10 and 3.13
show that simply increasing the rate of benign calls for a higher aggregate call rate (without any
malicious calls present) does not increase the memory usage nearly as much as maintaining the same
aggregate call rate with an increase in the fraction of malicious calls.
3.3.5 Processing Time
The final resource usage metric that we consider in the following figures is cumulative processing time
as a function of wall clock time. Similar to the heap size measurements, the cumulative processing
time measurements indicate that the processing time increases as we either increase the fraction of
malicious calls or increase the benign call pickup times.
Also, similar to the heap size measurements, comparing Figure 3.14 with Figure 3.17 and Figure
3.15 with Figure 3.18 shows that the processing time is significantly higher when UDP is used
compared to when TCP is used. Specifically, the cumulative processing time when UDP is used is
approximately twice the processing time required when TCP is used. Similar to the reason for the
difference in heap size, running SIP over UDP requires more processing at the application layer to
ensure reliable transmission compared to running SIP over TCP.
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Figure 3.9: Heap Size (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.10: Heap Size (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.11: Heap Size (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.12: Heap Size (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.13: Heap Size (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
Unlike transaction state and memory usage, Figures 3.16 and 3.19 show that increasing the rate
of benign calls for a higher aggregate call rate (without any malicious calls present) does result in
a comparable increase in processing time relative to maintaining the same aggregate call rate with
an increase in the fraction of malicious calls. In the case of Figures 3.16 and 3.19, although the
transaction state does not accumulate as much, the SIP proxy must handle more calls in a given
amount of time.
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Figure 3.14: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
Ti
m
e
 (
Se
c)
Time (sec)
BR=100, MR=0
BR=95, MR=5
BR=90, MR=10
BR=80, MR=20
BR=50, MR=50
No new calls
after 180 sec
Figure 3.15: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.16: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.17: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 3.18: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 3.19: Cumulative Processing Time (transport=UDP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Chapter 4
Early Termination Algorithms
In this chapter, we will present a family of three early termination algorithms that mitigate the
effects of transaction state overload at stateful multimedia servers. Each approach to early termina-
tion is based on monitoring the control messages in each session to extract accounting information
on the duration of each transaction and selectively terminating some transactions before their com-
pletion according to the policy of the specific algorithm. We refer to this type of accounting as
per-transaction accounting. Our per-transaction accounting and early termination algorithms are
designed to operate in a single server environment. However, environments with multiple servers
can deploy per-transaction accounting and early termination at each individual server.
For our purposes, a transaction is any one of the following session operations: (1) session es-
tablishment, (2) session modification, and (3) session termination. Our goal is to identify sessions
consisting of one or more transactions that might contribute to transaction state overload at the
multimedia server. To implement our transaction termination operation at the SIP proxy server,
we send a CANCEL request to the downstream UAS and a 504 Server Timeout final response to
the upstream UAC. Early termination essentially modifies both the client and server transaction
state machines at the SIP proxy server as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. At the end of this chap-
ter, we will thoroughly evaluate our early termination algorithms in the context of Ringing-based
denial-of-service attacks on SIP proxy servers.
4.1 Basic Early Termination
The simplest technique to prevent transaction state overload in an individual multimedia server
would be to set a limit on the maximum duration of all transactions. Any ongoing transactions that
exceed this limit would be terminated early. A basic early termination (BET) algorithm, which is
run at fixed time intervals on the multimedia server, is shown in Table 4.1. For accountability, this
algorithm simply maintains a list of all the currently active transactions and periodically terminates
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Proceeding
Calling Terminated
Event: Receive INVITE
Action: Forward INVITE
Event: Timer A Fires
Actions: Reset Timer A
and Retransmit INVITE
Event: Receive 1xx
Event: Receive 1xx
Event: Receive 2xx
Event: Timer B Fires
Figure 4.1: Client Transaction State Machine with Early Termination
Proceeding Terminated
Event: Receive INVITE
Action: Send 100
Event: Receive 2xx, Action: Forward 2xx
Event: Timer C Fires, Action: Send 5xx
*Event: Early Termination, Action: Send 5xx
Event: Receive INVITE, Action: Send 100
Event: Receive 101-199, Action: Forward 101-199
Figure 4.2: Server Transaction State Machine with Early Termination
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Input parameter:
MAXTD = maximum transaction duration
BET(MAXTD):
// Terminate transactions at fixed time intervals
L = list of all currently active transactions
numactive = number of currently active transactions
currenttime = current local time at server
for i = 0 to numactive − 1
transaction = L[i]
age = currenttime − transaction.timestamp
if age > MAXTD
TERMINATE transaction
Table 4.1: Basic Early Termination (BET) Algorithm
all of the transactions older than the limit.
Although very simple to implement, BET is inflexible. Similar to the problem of distinguishing
flash crowds from denial-of-service attacks [38], determining a precise maximum transaction duration
threshold (i.e.,MAXTD in Table 4.1) to distinguish between benign and malicious transactions is not
straightforward. Therefore, if a benign client workload has a large fraction of transaction durations
that exceed our maximum transaction threshold MAXTD, then BET might be too aggressive and
generate a large number of unnecessary terminations. Ideally, termination should only be done when
the server is experiencing transaction state overload.
4.2 Random Early Termination
A more flexible alternative to BET is random early termination (RET). As the name implies, RET
is partly inspired by the Random Early Detection (RED) algorithm used by routers for congestion
avoidance [26]. However, there are several substantial differences between the two algorithms that
will become more evident in this section. For example, one major difference is that probabilistic
dropping in RET considers transaction state used at the server by a particular ongoing transaction.
In contrast, RED considers bandwidth used at the router.
The basic idea behind RET is that stateful multimedia servers should terminate transactions most
likely to involve deliberate transaction state overload when the total amount of transaction state
at the server becomes too large. By preferentially terminating transactions with longer durations,
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Figure 4.3: Random Early Termination with Transactions Eligible for Probabilistic Dropping
more resources will be available for newer transactions that might otherwise be rejected without
protection from RET.
One critical aspect in the design of RET is selecting which transactions should be terminated.
Upon receiving a new request, the server will initialize the corresponding transaction context. A
current timestamp will then be added to this transaction context to later determine the transaction’s
age. To implement RET, the stateful server maintains a sorted list of all currently active transaction
contexts ordered from the newest to the oldest as shown in Figure 4.3. Under heavy transaction
load, transactions consuming the most resources (i.e., transactions with the longest durations) are
dropped from the sorted list periodically by running RET with a specified frequency.
In order to prevent a newly generated transaction from being terminated too soon, we added
the condition that a transaction can only be eligible for termination if it’s age exceeds a certain
minimum duration threshold MDT, which is a constant value that can be set as a parameter. MDT
is also used for probabilistic dropping as described in subsequent paragraphs.
In RET, two threshold parameters P1 and P2 are relative positions associated with the number of
active transaction contexts currently in the sorted list. All transactions from the newest transaction
context up to transaction context P1 (indicated by the white region in Figure 4.3) will not be
considered for termination. Therefore, under a light load with no more than P1 currently active
transactions, the server will not drop any ongoing transactions regardless of how long they have
been active. This prevents some of the unnecessary transaction terminations that might be seen
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Figure 4.4: Random Early Termination without Transactions Eligible for Probabilistic Dropping
in BET. If the number of active transactions is greater than P1, then all transactions between P1
up to P2 (indicated by the gray region in Figure 4.3), which are older than MDT, will be dropped
with a certain probability Prob shown in Equation 4.1. The value age in Equation 4.1 is determined
by taking the difference between the current time and the transaction context’s timestamp. Prob
increases from 0.0 when a transaction’s age is equal to MDT to 1.0 when a transaction’s age is
greater than or equal to twice the value of MDT. Notice that Equation 4.1 is similar to the gentle
mode of RED [26].
Prob =
age−MDT
MDT
(4.1)
The detailed RET algorithm is shown in Table 4.2. In RET, only transactions older than MDT
are eligible for termination. Equation 4.1 was chosen in order to gradually increase the probability
of transaction termination as the duration of the transaction significantly exceeds the MDT. Also,
if the number of active transactions at the server is greater than P2, then all transaction contexts
between P2 up to the oldest transaction (indicated by the black region in Figure 4.3), which are
older than MDT, will definitely be dropped. In Figure 4.4, we can see the effects of the safeguard
parameter MDT in preventing newly generated transactions from being terminated too soon.
Notice that transaction contexts are only removed from the sorted list of active transactions when
one of the following events occurs: (1) voluntary transaction termination or (2) forced transaction
termination by RET. Shorter transactions, which consume transaction state for a shorter period of
35
time, are thus less likely to be terminated.
As shown in Table 4.2, if the sorted list of transaction contexts has N transaction contexts cor-
responding to the state for N currently active transactions, then the RET algorithm will process
at most N − P1 transaction contexts as potential candidates for termination. Therefore, the RET
algorithm is O(N) in terms of running time. However, in order to reduce overhead, the frequency
with which the RET algorithm is run can be adjusted. For example, RET can be run every 500 mil-
liseconds, every second, or every two seconds. Longer periods lead to less reactiveness to transaction
state conditions at the server.
One consequence of using the safeguard parameter MDT to prevent the dropping of recently
initiated transactions is that an attacker could potentially flood the stateful server with many new
requests whose resulting transactions would not be dropped due to their young age as shown in
Table 4.2. However, such flooding-based DoS attacks have been previously addressed and are outside
the scope of RET [55, 60]. The RET algorithm is specifically designed to mitigate the effects of
transaction state overload. Flooding-based prevention mechanisms can be combined with RET to
collectively reduce the impact of both types of DoS attacks.
Another concern is that stealthy attackers might reduce their transaction durations during an
attack for a given traffic rate to avoid being dropped according to RET. However, by reducing their
transaction durations to avoid detection, the attackers would also reduce the amount of transaction
state in the server, which is our desired goal. In this case, RET would act as a deterrence to running
long transactions.
One final concern is that legitimate transactions that happen to be running for a long period
of time might be mistakenly dropped by RET. However, remember that the RET algorithm only
drops transactions when the server is under heavy load. When a server experiences a strain on its
local resources, one side effect of RET is that transactions running for a longer period of time would
be more likely to be dropped. An argument could be made that this behavior of RET is desirable
with respect to fairness of transaction state resource allocation at the multimedia server.
4.3 Adaptive Early Termination
Although the RET algorithm described in Section 4.2 provides more flexibility than the BET algo-
rithm described in Section 4.1, it still requires the manual tuning of three parameters: (MDT, P1,
and P2). In a heterogeneous system consisting of multiple servers with different capacities in terms
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Input parameters:
MDT = minimum duration threshold
P1 = threshold for probabilistic terminations
P2 = threshold for mandatory terminations
RET(MDT,P1,P2):
// Terminate transactions at fixed time intervals
L = ordered list of all currently active transactions
starting from oldest (at 0th index) to youngest
numactive = number of currently active transactions
currenttime = current local time at server
// Number of mandatory terminations X
X = maximum( 0, numactive − P2 )
// Number of potential probabilistic terminations Y
Y = maximum( 0, numactive − X − P1 )
// Terminate all transactions above P2, which are older than MDT
for i = 0 to X − 1
transaction = L[i]
age = currenttime − transaction.timestamp
if age > MDT
TERMINATE transaction
// Probabilistically terminate all transactions between P1 and P2,
// which are older than MDT
for i = X to X + Y − 1
transaction = L[i]
age = currenttime − transaction.timestamp
if age > MDT
P = ( age − MDT ) / MDT
TERMINATE transaction with probability P
Table 4.2: Random Early Termination (RET) Algorithm
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of the maximum number of active server transactions that can be handled simultaneously, the cost
of system administrators manually tuning each server (i.e., finding an appropriate P1 and P2 for
each particular server) could be prohibitive.
In this section, we present an adaptive early termination (AET) algorithm similar to BET
with a maximum transaction duration MAXTD that adjusts dynamically according to an additive
increase / multiplicative decrease (AIMD) controller. AIMD controllers have previously been used
for congestion avoidance in the Internet [15]. Unlike AIMD controllers used for congestion avoidance,
our algorithm is centralized and we limit the maximum transaction duration rather than the sending
rate of a particular endpoint. In order to deploy our AIMD controller, a server administrator
would have to specify an absolute minimum transaction duration limit MINLIMIT and an absolute
maximum transaction duration limit MAXLIMIT. These are the minimum and maximum limits,
respectively, on the maximum transaction duration MAXTD enforced by AET.
Similar to BET and RET, our AET algorithm is run periodically at fixed time intervals. When
the server is under capacity (in terms of transaction state) during a periodic execution of AET, the
maximum transaction durationMAXTD would be allowed to additively increase by α in each interval
up to the absolute maximum transaction duration limit MAXLIMIT. Conversely, when the server
is over capacity, the maximum transaction duration MAXTD would multiplicatively decrease by a
factor of β in each interval down to the absolute minimum transaction duration limit MINLIMIT.
MINLIMIT would be analogous to the safeguard parameter MDT in RET. The details of our AET
algorithm are shown in Table 4.3. In AET, we assume that each server can detect transaction state
overload by monitoring the number of errors caused by an excessive number of active transactions.
Although the AET algorithm involves four parameters, these parameters are specific to the
application characteristics, rather than the transaction state capacity of a particular server running
the multimedia application. In contrast, RET involves setting two parameters, P1 and P2, which
are specific to the capacity of each server. The four parameters in AET can be reused for each server
running the same type of application regardless of its capacity.
Previous analysis of increase/decrease algorithms for congestion control has shown that AIMD
controllers can achieve distributed convergence to efficiency and fairness [15]. Following similar
reasoning, we will show that our AET algorithm, which runs locally on one server, also converges to
efficiency and fairness without the distributedness requirement. Similar to [15], we will then analyze
the convergence time (i.e., responsiveness) and oscillation size (i.e., smoothness) for our particular
controller shown in Table 4.3.
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Input parameters:
MINLIMIT = absolute minimum transaction duration limit
MAXLIMIT = absolute maximum transaction duration limit
ALPHA = additive increase parameter
BETA = multiplicative decrease parameter
AET(MINLIMIT,MAXLIMIT,ALPHA,BETA):
// Terminate transactions at fixed time intervals
L = list of all currently active transactions
numactive = number of currently active transactions
MAXTD = adaptive maximum transaction duration limit
overloaded = is the server currently overloaded?
currenttime = current local time
// Adjust current transaction duration limit
if overloaded = false
// Additively increase transaction duration limit
MAXTD = minimum( MAXTD + ALPHA, MAXLIMIT )
else if overloaded = true
// Multiplicatively decrease transaction duration limit
MAXTD = maximum( BETA · MAXTD, MINLIMIT )
// Drop all transactions older than the current maximum transaction
// duration limit
for i = 0 to numactive − 1
transaction = L[i]
age = currenttime − transaction.timestamp
if age > MAXTD
TERMINATE transaction
Table 4.3: Adaptive Early Termination (AET) Algorithm
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4.3.1 Convergence to Efficiency
Since distinguishing between benign and malicious transactions at the multimedia server based only
on their durations is a difficult problem as mentioned in Section 4.1, we would like to utilize server
resources as much as possible before terminating excessively long running transactions. Therefore,
we require our AET algorithm to converge to efficiency in order to avoid unnecessary transaction
terminations whenever possible. We first show the necessary conditions for the α parameter to ensure
that our AET algorithm does not decrease the maximum transaction duration limit MAXTD when
the server is not overloaded. Next, we show the necessary conditions for the β parameter to ensure
that our AET algorithm does not increase the transaction duration limit MAXTD when the server
is overloaded. In the following equations, MAXTD is shown as a function of time intervals where
AET is run once every time interval.
Additive Increase
MAXTD(t+ 1) > MAXTD(t)
α+MAXTD(t) > MAXTD(t)
α > 0
Multiplicative Decrease
MAXTD(t+ 1) < MAXTD(t)
β ·MAXTD(t) < MAXTD(t)
β < 1
Therefore, as long as our α parameter is greater than zero and our β parameter is less than one,
our AET algorithm converges to efficiency by the principle of negative feedback [15].
4.3.2 Convergence to Fairness
In terms of preventing transaction state overload, we define fairness as the requirement that no
currently active transaction is allowed to consume transaction state resources for a longer period
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of time than another transaction. Since transaction termination is determined locally based on a
locally maintained list of currently active transactions, a server utilizing our AET algorithm can
centrally enforce the same maximum transaction duration limitMAXTD for each active transaction.
With each transaction subject to the same transaction duration limit constraints, no transaction
can consume transaction state for a longer amount of time than another transaction.
4.3.3 Convergence Time
The time it takes our AET algorithm to converge from an initial maximum transaction duration
limit MAXTDstart to a target maximum transaction duration limit MAXTDend represents its re-
sponsiveness. In terms of increasing MAXTD, we would start at MINLIMIT and additively increase
to MAXLIMIT in the worst case. In terms of decreasing MAXTD, we would start at MAXLIMIT
and multiplicatively decrease to MINLIMIT in the worst case. We quantify the convergence time T
in the number of time intervals required to adjust from MAXTDstart to MAXTDend.
Additive Increase
MAXTDstart + α · T =MAXTDend
α · T =MAXTDend −MAXTDstart
T = dMAXTDend −MAXTDstart
α
e
Multiplicative Decrease
MAXTDstart · βT =MAXTDend
βT =
MAXTDend
MAXTDstart
T = logβ
MAXTDend
MAXTDstart
T = d log
MAXTDend
MAXTDstart
log β
e
4.3.4 Oscillation Size
The oscillation size of our AET algorithm corresponds to the maximum overshoot when we in-
crease/decrease from MAXTDstart to MAXTDend. As pointed out in [15], there is a trade-off
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between responsiveness (i.e., convergence time) and smoothness (i.e., oscillation size). We quantify
the maximum overshoot of our AET algorithm for the cases of additive increase and multiplicative
decrease.
maxoverincrease =MAXTDend + α
maxoverdecrease = β ·MAXTDend
4.4 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate our early termination algorithms in a realistic application scenario, we extended
our implementation of a stateful SIP proxy server built with the JAIN SIP stack by adding code for
each algorithm [7]. Each algorithm was implemented as a periodic task that ran once every second.
User agent traffic for our experiments was generated by the open source SIPp performance testing
tool, which is often used to evaluate SIP proxy server implementations [10].
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup, which appears in Figure 4.5, consisted of three machines connected over
a local area network. One machine ran all of the emulated SIPp user agent clients (UACs) that
sent session initiation requests. Another machine ran all of the emulated SIPp user agent servers
(UASs) that received session initiation requests. The last machine ran our stateful JAIN SIP proxy
server. TCP was used as the underlying transport protocol for all of the experiments. The JAIN
SIP stack has a configurable parameter for the maximum number of server transactions. The JAIN
SIP stack will begin refusing transactions (i.e., send 503 Service Unavailable responses) when it
exceeds its configured capacity. These error responses are measured as failures due to transaction
state overload in our experiments. The stateful JAIN SIP proxy server would run in one of the
following modes: unprotected, BET-protected, RET-protected, and AET-protected.
4.4.2 Workload Characteristics
We were able to control the incoming call rate from the UACs and ringing times at the UASs
by adjusting the appropriate parameters in SIPp. For each experiment, we used SIPp to emulate
benign UACs calling benign UASs and malicious UACs calling malicious UASs. Since both benign
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Figure 4.5: Experimental Setup
and malicious calls went through the same proxy in the experiments, malicious calls were able to
cause disruptions in benign calls through Ringing-based DoS attacks on the proxy.
In all of our experiments, the aggregate incoming traffic rate at the SIP proxy was 100 calls per
second (cps) for a duration of three minutes. After the three minutes of new incoming calls, we
continued to observe the system until all calls had ended either successfully or unsuccessfully. The
only variable within each set of experiments was the fraction of the fixed aggregate incoming call
traffic rate originating from malicious UACs. The incoming call rate from the malicious UACs varied
between 0 and 50 cps. The incoming call rate from the benign UACs was always 100 cps minus the
incoming call rate from the malicious UACs in each experiment to maintain a fixed aggregate call
rate of 100 cps.
We deliberately chose a low incoming call traffic rate to clearly demonstrate that the call failures
experienced at the benign UACs were caused by the Ringing-based DoS attack on the proxy. If a
high traffic rate had been used, then it would not be clear whether the calls failed due to bandwidth
exhaustion at the proxy, which has previously been considered in flooding-based DoS attacks, or an
excess amount of transaction state maintained at the proxy, which is the focus of our work.
We ran two different sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments, benign calls had ringing
times uniformly distributed between 1 and 15 seconds. According to Little’s law, the expected long-
term average number of active transactions in the system should be 800 transactions assuming an
expected call pickup time of 8 seconds. The SIP proxy server used in this first set of experiments
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had a maximum server transaction capacity of 1000 simultaneous transactions, which means that
the expected transaction state load should only reach 80% of the maximum server capacity for a
completely benign workload. The call pickup time for this set of experiments was chosen based
on the Bell Labs study mentioned in Section 3.2. In the second set of experiments, benign calls
had ringing times uniformly distributed between 1 and 45 seconds. According to Little’s law, the
expected long-term average number of active transactions in the system should be 2300 transactions
assuming an expected call pickup time of 23 seconds. The SIP proxy server used in this second
set of experiments had a maximum server transaction capacity of 2875 simultaneous transactions,
which means that the expected transaction state load should only reach 80% of the maximum server
capacity for a completely benign workload.
For all of our experiments, malicious calls had ringing times uniformly distributed between 30
and 120 seconds. According to RFC 3261, a UAS has up to three minutes between responses (e.g.,
between sending a 180 Ringing provisional response and a 200 OK final response), which means
that the malicious calls in our experiments do not violate the SIP specification, which is consistent
with our attack model that assumes no deviation by malicious user agents from the SIP protocol
[56]. The call pickup time distribution in our second set of experiments (i.e., 1 to 45 seconds) was
deliberately chosen to observe the effects of our early termination algorithms when the benign call
pickup time distribution overlaps with the malicious call pickup time distribution.
4.4.3 Metrics
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our early termination algorithms, we considered the following
four metrics: (1) benign call failure rate, (2) benign call drop rate, (3) benign call success rate, and
(4) overall success rate. The benign call failure rate is the fraction of benign calls that fail due
to SIP proxy server transaction state overload. Such call failures are indicated with 503 Service
Unavailable response messages from the SIP proxy server. The benign call drop rate is the fraction
of calls that are mistakenly terminated by one of the early termination algorithms. Such call drops
are indicated with 504 Server Timeout response messages from the SIP proxy server. Benign
call drops are analogous to false positives. The benign call success rate is the fraction of calls
that completed successfully. In other words, the benign call success rate is the fraction of calls
that complete with 200 OK final responses, rather than 503 Service Unavailable or 504 Server
Timeout responses. Our first three metrics focus on the perceived quality experienced at benign
nodes. However, since the distinction between benign and malicious behavior might not be as clear
44
in practice, we also considered the overall call success rate as a measure of the efficiency of the
early termination algorithm for our final metric. The overall call success rate is the fraction of both
benign and malicious calls that completed successfully with 200 OK final responses, rather than 503
Service Unavailable or 504 Server Timeout responses.
4.4.4 Proxy Settings
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.4.2, the maximum server capacity was 1000 simultaneous transac-
tions when the benign call pickup times were uniformly distributed between 1 and 15 seconds. The
maximum server capacity was 2875 simultaneous transactions when the benign call pickup times
were uniformly distributed between 1 and 45 seconds.
The unprotected SIP proxy did not run any of the early termination algorithms. As described
in Section 4.1, the BET algorithm utilizes a single parameter. For our experiments, the maximum
transaction duration limit MAXTD was set to MAXTD = 15 seconds for both sets of experiments.
Thus, all incoming calls over 15 seconds would be dropped according to our BET algorithm.
As described in Section 4.2, the RET algorithm utilizes three parameters. For our experiments,
the minimum duration threshold MDT was set to MDT = 15 seconds. Thus, an incoming call is
only eligible to be dropped after 15 seconds. The first transaction context threshold parameter P1
was set to 700 transactions. The second transaction context threshold parameter P2 was set to 900
transactions. The parameters P1 and P2 were chosen based on the long-term expected transaction
state needed at our SIP proxy to handle the specified incoming call rate of 100 cps when all calls
are benign in the first set of experiments (i.e., benign ringing times no longer than 15 seconds).
As described in Section 4.3, the AET algorithm utilizes four parameters. For our experiments,
the absolute minimum transaction duration limit MINLIMIT was set to MINLIMIT = 15 seconds
to be consistent with our other early termination algorithms. The absolute maximum transaction
duration limit MAXLIMIT was set to MAXXLIMIT = 180 seconds, which is the maximum amount
of time allowed between the 180 Ringing provisional response and 200 OK final response according
to the SIP specification [56]. Our initial maximum transaction duration limit MAXTD was set equal
to MAXLIMIT. As for our AIMD controller, we set the parameter α = 1 second for all experiments
and tested three different parameter values for β = {0.2,0.5,0.8}.
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4.4.5 Discussion of Results
In the following sections, we will discuss the experimental results for both sets of experiments for
all three early termination algorithms with respect to the performance metrics identified in Section
4.4.3. In the first set, the benign call pickup times were uniformly distributed between 1 and 15
seconds. In the second set, the benign call pickup times were uniformly distributed between 1 and
45 seconds.
First Set
As shown by the benign call success rates in Figure 4.8, all three of the early termination algorithms
lead to a higher proportion of successful benign calls compared to doing nothing at all. The BET
and RET algorithms, whose parameters were tuned for this particular set of experiments, performed
slightly better than the AET algorithm with different values of β. Part of the reason for the slightly
better performance of BET and RET over AET is shown in Figure 4.6 where the benign call failure
rate for AET is slightly higher than both BET and RET. AET is likely to have more failures because
failures are needed to trigger the multiplicative decrease in AET. For this set of experiments, all
three algorithms also have very low benign call drop rates as shown in Figure 4.7. In particular,
AET with β = 0.8, did not have any benign call drops at all. This low rate of false positives is due
to the conservative choice of the parameter β = 0.8. All three early termination algorithms also lead
to higher overall call success rates for benign and malicious calls combined. Much of this efficiency
is due to the early termination algorithms protecting resources for benign calls.
Second Set
The benefit of the AET algorithm becomes apparent when the maximum benign call pickup time
is set to 45 seconds for the second set of experiments. As shown by the benign call success rates
in Figure 4.12, using AET with parameter β = 0.8 is better than doing nothing at all or any of
the other early termination algorithms. The benign call success rate for other lower β values of
AET is lower because they are more aggressive with respect to dropping calls. It appears that
using AET with a conservative choice of parameter β = 0.8 leads to the best performance. AET
clearly outperforms both BET and RET because the parameters for AET are not closely tied to the
workload or server capacity. For example, the MAXTD parameter for BET must be chosen based
on the expected maximum benign call pickup time. Furthermore, the P1 and P2 parameters in
RET should be chosen based on the server capacity. Unlike BET and RET, AET is more flexible
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Figure 4.6: Benign Failure Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
because it does not depend as much on the underlying workload or server capacity.
Although the benign failure rates for all three early termination algorithms are reasonably low
as shown in Figure 4.10, the reason for the poor overall performance of BET and RET can be seen
in Figure 4.11. Unlike AET, the parameters chosen for BET and RET in the first set of experiments
do not work well for the second set of experiments. Both BET and RET have very high benign
call drop rates due to their parameter values. AET also leads to a higher overall call success rate
compared to the other early termination algorithms.
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Figure 4.7: Benign Drop Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 4.8: Benign Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 4.9: Overall Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50
B
e
n
ig
n
 F
ai
lu
re
 R
at
e
 (
5
0
3
 S
e
rv
ic
e
 U
n
av
ai
la
b
le
)
Fraction of Malicious Calls
None
BET
RET
AET (b=0.2)
AET (b=0.5)
AET (b=0.8)
Figure 4.10: Benign Failure Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 4.11: Benign Drop Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50
B
e
n
ig
n
 C
al
l S
u
cc
e
ss
 R
at
e
Fraction of Malicious Calls
None
BET
RET
AET (b=0.2)
AET (b=0.5)
AET (b=0.8)
Figure 4.12: Benign Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 4.13: Overall Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Chapter 5
Admission Control Algorithms
The malicious transaction state overload problem introduced in Chapter 3 is not strictly limited
to attacks on individual multimedia servers. In this chapter, we will present two admission control
algorithms that mitigate the effects of transaction state overload on clusters of stateful multimedia
servers. Both approaches to admission control are based on monitoring the control messages sent
from each client to extract accounting information on the aggregate transaction state consumption
of each client and selectively rejecting requests from clients exceeding their fair share according to
the policy of the specific algorithm. We refer to this type of accounting as per-client accounting.
Our per-client accounting and admission algorithms are designed to operate in cluster environments
comprising multiple servers.
In a multimedia server cluster, if a server makes admission control decisions locally, then it is dif-
ficult to enforce aggregate transaction state limits on individual clients. For example, when multiple
servers collectively implement a service, each server S can individually determine its local transac-
tion resources allocated to some client C. However, S cannot determine the aggregate transaction
state usage of C from the overall service. This lack of awareness among servers regarding C’s overall
transaction state usage creates an opportunity for C to make several requests to multiple servers
where each request locally appears to comply with system transaction state limits. However, when
all of the requests are considered in aggregate, C is actually violating a system-wide transaction
limit policy. This could be classified as a type of request spreading attack, which has been consid-
ered previously as a threat to content distribution networks [67]. Figure 5.1 shows an example of
such a request spreading attack where a client has sent three separate requests under its maximum
aggregate transaction limit. However, its overall aggregate transaction state usage violates system
policy. If one or more malicious clients repeatedly spread their requests among multiple servers in
a server cluster, then cluster resources might be unavailable for well-behaved users.
Our admission control algorithms are implemented at the gateway node of a SIP cluster that
observes all incoming requests and outgoing responses between user agents. Unlike early termina-
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Figure 5.1: Request Spreading Attack
tion, which considers each transaction independently, our admission control algorithms enable us
to consider the aggregate behavior of individual user agents. Gateway nodes have previously been
proposed for load balancing and control message routing for SIP proxy server clusters, such as the
architecture described in [36]. An example of this system architecture appears in Figure 5.2. For
admission control, upon receiving an incoming INVITE request from some UAC, the gateway node
will determine whether or not the request should be accepted or rejected based on the policy of the
particular admission control algorithm used. Accepted requests are forwarded to backend SIP proxy
servers in the cluster. The gateway sends a 603 Decline final response for rejected requests. At
the end of this chapter, we will thoroughly evaluate our admission control algorithms in the context
of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks on clusters of SIP proxy servers.
5.1 Maintaining Accounting Information
The basic idea behind per-client monitoring for accounting is to leverage the existing cluster gateway
node (shown in Figure 5.2) to monitor the incoming control messages for session establishment,
modification, and termination as well as the outgoing response messages. It should be noted that the
cluster gateway node only forwards signaling messages in the control plane. The cluster gateway node
does not forward media packets in the data plane. The control messages and their corresponding
responses can be used in conjunction with timestamps to determine a client’s aggregate transaction
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Active Transactions Transaction Information
transaction1 (userA, transaction1, timestamp1)
transaction2 (userB , transaction2, timestamp2)
transaction3 (userC , transaction3, timestamp3)
. . . . . .
Table 5.1: Lookup Table Identifying Active Transactions (ActiveTrans)
state usage at the cluster gateway node.
To assist with accounting operations, the multimedia server cluster gateway node maintains two
lookup tables. The first table ActiveTrans maps identifiers for all ongoing transactions to a single
tuple containing the client identifier, transaction identifier, and timestamp corresponding to the
transaction’s start time. ActiveTrans represents the overall transaction state in the entire system.
The format of the first table is shown in Table 5.1. The second table ActiveUsers maps identifiers for
all active clients with at least one ongoing transaction to a list of tuples representing its aggregate
transaction state usage on a per-user basis. Similar to the first table, each tuple in the list contains
a client identifier, transaction identifier, and associated timestamp indicating when that transaction
was initiated. The format of the second table is shown in Table 5.2.
Whenever a client sends a message to initiate a transaction, the gateway will add or update the
appropriate entries in both lookup tables to reflect the new transaction and additional transaction
state usage. Whenever a final response is received to terminate an ongoing transaction (e.g., 200
OK in SIP) or a client sends a message to terminate an ongoing transaction (e.g., CANCEL in SIP),
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Clients Active Transactions Per Client
userA (userA, transactionA1, timestampA1), . . . , (userA, transactionAn, timestampAn)
userB (userB , transactionB1, timestampB1), . . . , (userB , transactionBn, timestampBn)
userC (userC , transactionC1, timestampC1), . . . , (userC , transactionCn, timestampCn)
. . . . . .
Table 5.2: Lookup Table Mapping Active Users to List of Their Active Transactions (ActiveUsers)
the gateway will update the appropriate entries in both lookup tables to remove the entry for that
client.
5.2 Transaction State Admission Control (TSAC)
The first of our admission control algorithms, which we refer to as transaction state admission control
(TSAC), attempts to allocate transaction state resources as evenly to active users as possible when
the system is overloaded. The basic transaction state metric used for admission control is the
number of active transactions for a particular user. In TSAC, the gateway cluster node will look
at the current amount of transaction state being utilized in the system relative to the number of
active users in the system. Clients using a higher proportion of transaction state in the system will
have future requests rejected while clients using less transaction state in the system will have future
requests admitted.
Our TSAC algorithm also takes a parameter β, which allows us to tune how aggressively we want
to limit users when the system is overloaded. If β is greater than 1.0, then users will be allowed
more than their computed fair share when the system is overloaded. If β is less than 1.0, then users
will be allowed less than their fair share when the system is overloaded. The pseudocode for TSAC
appears in Table 5.3.
5.3 Transaction State Duration Admission Control
(TSDAC)
Our second admission control algorithm, which we refer to as transaction state duration admis-
sion control (TSDAC), is very similar to our first admission control algorithm with one very im-
portant difference. In TSDAC, the transaction state metric used is the number of transaction-
seconds currently consumed in the system rather than the number of transactions. For a given
set of transactions, the number of transaction-seconds in the set is equal to the sum of the du-
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Input parameters:
R = request from some client
TSAC(beta,R):
// Apply admission control policy
client = R.client
users = table of all currently active users (i.e., ActiveUsers from Table 5.2)
trans = table of all currently active transactions (i.e., ActiveTrans from Table 5.1)
overloaded = is the cluster currently overloaded?
if overloaded:
// Determine number of active transactions for client
L = users.lookup(client)
usageclient = |L|
// Determine total number of active transactions in the system
usagetotal = |trans|
// Determine fair share of transaction state resources per client
limit = beta · usagetotal|users|
// Deny admission if additional request would put client over fair share
if usageclient + 1 > limit
DENY
GRANT
Table 5.3: Transaction State Admission Control (TSAC)
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Input parameters:
R = request from some client
TSDAC(beta,R):
// Apply admission control policy
client = R.client
users = table of all currently active users (i.e., ActiveUsers from Table 5.2)
trans = table of all currently active transactions (i.e., ActiveTrans from Table 5.1)
overloaded = is the cluster currently overloaded?
currenttime = current time at gateway node
if overloaded:
// Determine number of active transaction-seconds for client
L = users.lookup(client)
usageclient =
∑
currenttime− tuple.timestamp where tuple  L
// Determine total number of active transaction-seconds in the system
usagetotal =
∑
currenttime− tuple.timestamp where tuple  trans
// Determine fair share of transaction-seconds per client
limit = beta · usagetotal|users|
// Deny admission if additional request would put client over fair share
if usageclient + 1 > limit
DENY
GRANT
Table 5.4: Transaction State Duration Admission Control (TSDAC)
rations for all transactions in the set. For example, if the current time is T = 10, then the set
S = {(transA, 3), (transB , 7), (transC , 8)} has 7 + 3 + 2 = 12 transaction-seconds.
The reason that we consider transaction-seconds is to add additional context to admission control
decisions similar to the information used for the single server case in Chapter 4. Transaction-seconds
make it easier to identify users, who currently have several long ongoing transactions in the system.
The pseudocode for TSDAC is shown in Table 5.4.
5.3.1 Approximation with Transaction State Duration Histogram
The number of active transaction-seconds in the system is constantly changing. In Table 5.4, when-
ever a client sends a new request, the TSDAC algorithm must scan through the entire ActiveTrans
table to compute the total number of active transaction-seconds currently in the system. Scanning
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a potentially large table for each incoming request would require O(NumActiveTrans) steps where
NumActiveTrans is the number of transactions currently in the system. Alternatively, TSDAC
could run a periodic task every second that increments a counter once for each transaction currently
in the system and subtracts one transaction duration time from this counter whenever a transaction
terminates. In this section, we will introduce a histogram-based data structure that allows us to
approximate the total number of active transaction-seconds currently in the system in O(1) steps
without scanning the entire ActiveTrans table or creating a separate periodic task.
A transaction state duration histogram can be thought of as a sliding window summarizing start
times for the currently active transactions in the system, which are stored in the ActiveTrans table.
Each bin in the histogram is associated with a time period of length p seconds with lower bound
timestamp lower. The count of each bin b represents the number of currently active transactions
that started during the time period associated with b. The range of the histogram is the total
amount of time captured in the histogram, which is equal to the number of bins times the period
p. After every time period p, a new bin is added and an old bin is removed. Our implementation
uses a single array that wraps around similar to a circular buffer. It is important that the range
of a transaction state duration histogram be at least as large as the maximum timeout value for a
transaction. For example, the range would need to be 180 seconds for SIP transactions since the
protocol allows a maximum of three minutes between responses. An example histogram is shown in
Figure 5.3.
Whenever a new transaction enters the system, we increment the count for the most recently
added bin. Whenever a transaction leaves the system, we look up its timestamp from ActiveTrans
to locate its bin and decrement the count for that bin. Our specific algorithm for approximating the
number of transaction-seconds in the system appears in Table 5.5. Essentially, we use the midpoint
of the time period covered by an individual bin to represent the age of all active transactions
currently in that bin. Therefore, the maximum error in our approximation to the total number of
transaction-seconds in the system is equal to NumActiveTrans · p2 where NumActiveTrans is the
total number of active transactions in the system and p is the period for each bin. For a given
time range that we want to cover by the transaction state duration histogram, we can increase the
accuracy by using more bins with smaller periods per bin. However, increasing the number of bins
increases the number of steps during our approximation of the number of total transaction-seconds
in the system.
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Figure 5.3: Transaction State Duration Histogram
Input parameters:
currenttime = current time at gateway node
APPROX-TS(currenttime):
// Approximate the total number of transaction-seconds in the system
histogram = transaction state duration histogram
TOTAL = 0
for each bin in histogram
approxage = currenttime − ( bin.lower + bin.period2 )
TOTAL = TOTAL + bin.count · approxage
return TOTAL
Table 5.5: Transaction State Duration Histogram Approximation
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NumBins P (sec) Avg. Error
18 10 0.45724
45 4 0.10237
90 2 0.02874
180 1 0.01444
Table 5.6: Transaction State Duration Histogram Accuracy
5.3.2 Histogram Accuracy
Before measuring the effectiveness of our TSAC and TSDAC algorithms, we first measure the accu-
racy of the transaction state duration histograms for approximating the total number of transaction-
seconds in the system. For this experiment, we set up one machine running benign SIPp user agent
clients calling benign SIPp user agent servers on another machine. The user agent servers had call
pickup times uniformly distributed from 1 to 30 seconds. The incoming call rate was 10 calls per
second for a duration of 30 seconds.
All calls were routed through our gateway node for measurement purposes. Whenever a trans-
action was added or removed from the system, our SIP gateway node would compute the actual
number of transaction-seconds in the system and compare that value to the estimated number of
transaction-seconds in the system as approximated by our transaction state duration histogram.
Our results appear in Table 5.6. We varied the number of bins NumBins and bin periods P for
each run. The range covered by the histogram was 180 seconds for each experiment, which is the
maximum transaction duration for SIP during call establishment. For each transaction addition or
removal, we measured the error between the actual and estimated number of transaction-seconds in
the system as a percentage of the actual number of transaction-seconds in the system.
As expected, there is a trade-off between the number of bins used and the average error between
the actual number of transaction-seconds in the system and the estimated value computed from
our transaction state duration histograms. Using 180 bins with a bin period of 1 second yields an
average error of less than 2%.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate our admission control algorithms, we implemented a stateless SIP proxy server
built with the JAIN SIP stack and added code for each algorithm [7]. Our stateless SIP proxy
server simply forwarded messages to backend stateful SIP proxy servers, which did not run any of
the early termination algorithms (i.e., unprotected mode). User agent traffic for our experiments
60
500 –MR
cps
MR
cps Gateway
SIP Proxy
Malicious
UACs
Malicious
UASs
Benign
UACs
Benign
UASs
monet1.uiuc.edu monet2.uiuc.eduIllinois Cloud Computing Testbed
SIP Proxy
Cluster
Figure 5.4: Experimental Setup
was generated by the open source SIPp performance testing tool, which is often used to evaluate
SIP proxy server implementations [10].
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup, which appears in Figure 5.4, consisted of two machines connected over a
local area network as well as six additional nodes from the Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed (CCT)
[6]. One machine ran all of the emulated SIPp user agent clients (UACs) that sent session initiation
requests. Another machine ran all of the emulated SIPp user agent servers (UASs) that received
session initiation requests. The stateless JAIN SIP proxy server, which acted as the gateway node,
was run on a machine in the CCT. Five stateful JAIN SIP proxy servers were run on the CCT to
act as backend proxy servers in the cluster. All incoming calls were routed from the gateway proxy
to one of the stateful SIP proxies based on a pseudo-random hash of the Call-ID header field. The
stateful SIP proxies were not protected by any of the early termination algorithms. The gateway
node in our experiments observed all SIP requests and responses. The gateway would run in one of
the following modes: unprotected, TSAC-protected, and TSDAC-protected.
5.4.2 Workload Characteristics
Similar to our experiments in Section 4.4, we were able to control the incoming call rate from the
UACs and ringing times at the UASs by adjusting the appropriate parameters in SIPp. For each
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experiment, we used SIPp to emulate benign UACs calling benign UASs and malicious UACs calling
malicious UASs. Since both benign and malicious calls went through the same set of proxies in the
experiments, malicious calls were able to cause disruptions in benign calls through Ringing-based
DoS attacks on the stateful proxies. The stateless gateway proxy was not affected by the Ringing-
based DoS attack because it did not maintain transaction state.
In all of our experiments, the aggregate incoming traffic rate at the SIP proxy cluster was 500
calls per second (cps) for a duration of three minutes. After the three minutes of new incoming calls,
we continued to observe the system until all calls had ended either successfully or unsuccessfully.
The only variable within each set of experiments was the fraction of the fixed aggregate incoming call
traffic rate originating from malicious UACs. The incoming call rate from the malicious UACs varied
between 0 and 250 cps. The incoming call rate from the benign UACs was always 500 cps minus
the incoming call rate from the malicious UACs in each experiment to maintain a fixed aggregate
call rate of 500 cps. Each individual UAC, which is emulated by SIPp, called at the same rate.
We ran two different sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments, benign calls had ringing
times uniformly distributed between 1 and 15 seconds. According to Little’s law, the expected long-
term average number of active transactions in the system should be 4000 transactions assuming an
expected call pickup time of 8 seconds. Each SIP proxy server used in this first set of experiments
had a maximum server transaction capacity of 1000 simultaneous transactions for an aggregate
transaction capacity of 5000 simultaneous transactions for the entire cluster, which means that
the expected transaction state load should only reach 80% of the maximum server capacity for a
completely benign workload. The call pickup time for this set of experiments was chosen based on the
Bell Labs study mentioned in Section 3.2. In the second set of experiments, benign calls had ringing
times uniformly distributed between 1 and 45 seconds. According to Little’s law, the expected long-
term average number of active transactions in the system should be 11,500 transactions assuming an
expected call pickup time of 23 seconds. Each SIP proxy server used in this second set of experiments
had a maximum server transaction capacity of 2875 simultaneous transactions for an aggregate
transaction capacity of 14,375 simultaneous transactions for the entire cluster, which means that
the expected transaction state load should only reach 80% of the maximum server capacity for a
completely benign workload.
For all of our experiments, malicious calls had ringing times uniformly distributed between 30
and 120 seconds. According to RFC 3261, a UAS has up to three minutes between responses (e.g.,
between sending a 180 Ringing provisional response and a 200 OK final response), which means
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that the malicious calls in our experiments do not violate the SIP specification, which is consistent
with our attack model that assumes no deviation by malicious user agents from the SIP protocol
[56]. The call pickup time distribution in our second set of experiments (i.e., 1 to 45 seconds) was
deliberately chosen to observe the effects of our admission control algorithms when the benign call
pickup time distribution overlaps with the malicious call pickup time distribution.
5.4.3 Metrics
Similar to our performance evaluation in Section 4.4, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of our
admission control algorithms, we considered the following four metrics: (1) benign call failure rate,
(2) benign call drop rate, (3) benign call success rate, and (4) overall call success rate. The benign call
failure rate is the fraction of benign calls that fail due to SIP proxy server overload on the backend SIP
proxy servers in the cluster. Such failures are indicated with 503 Service Unavailable response
messages observed at the gateway node from the stateful SIP proxy servers. The benign call drop
rate is the fraction of benign calls that are mistakenly denied with 603 Decline response messages
due to one of our admission control algorithms at the gateway. The benign call success rate is the
fraction of benign calls that complete successfully (i.e., neither failed due to overload nor mistakenly
dropped). Successful calls receive 200 OK final responses from the backend SIP proxy servers via
the gateway. Finally, we considered the overall call success rate of both benign and malicious calls.
5.4.4 Proxy Settings
For both TSAC and TSDAC, the gateway proxy server only took parameter β as a setting. We used
the following three values for β: 0.9, 1.0, and 1.1. Additionally, when the gateway proxy server ran
TSDAC, it set the number of histogram bins to 180 and the histogram bin period to 1 second for
transaction state duration histogram approximation.
5.4.5 Discussion of Results
As shown by the benign failure rates in Figures 5.5 and 5.9, both TSAC and TSDAC significantly
reduce the number of benign call failures due to overload at the backend SIP proxy servers. For a
given value of β, TSAC has slightly fewer benign call failures because it frees up more transaction
resources in the cluster due to its more aggressive call dropping as shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.10.
Although TSAC has a slightly lower benign call failure rate compared to TSDAC, the benign
call drop rates shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.10 indicate that TSAC mistakenly drops more benign
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calls than TSDAC for any value of β. The reason for the lower benign call drop rate with TSDAC is
likely caused by the ability of its transaction metric to more effectively distinguish between benign
and malicious UACs during Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks. TSAC uses the number of
transactions as the metric while TSDAC uses the number of transaction-seconds as the metric.
Transaction-seconds are explained in Section 5.3. Also, as the value of β increases, then the number
of benign call drops is reduced for both algorithms at the expense of potentially more benign call
failures.
As shown by the benign call success rates in Figures 5.7 and 5.11, TSAC improves the benign call
success rate for most values of β compared to doing nothing at all. However, TSAC performs better
in Figure 5.7 when the benign call pickup times do not overlap with the malicious call pickup times
compared to Figure 5.11 when benign and malicious call pickup times overlap. Overall, TSDAC
clearly improves the benign call success rate compared to TSAC in both Figures 5.7 and 5.11. The
results for the overall call success rates shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.12 follow a similar pattern.
From these results, it seems that a larger value of β should be used by TSAC to avoid too
many unnecessary benign call drops. The different values of β for TSDAC did not have much
impact on its performance in these sets of experiments. Furthermore, TSDAC outperforms TSAC
in these experiments, which indicates that transaction-seconds are a better transaction state metric
for admission control algorithms trying to prevent Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks.
Although the two types of algorithms were evaluated separately, it would be possible to combine
both early termination and admission control at a SIP proxy server cluster to prevent Ringing-
based denial-of-service attacks. Using both algorithms for complementary protection would allow a
system administrator to deploy admission control with relaxed parameters (e.g., a larger β value)
to avoid benign call drops at the gateway while early termination is deployed with more aggressive
parameters (e.g., larger multiplicative decrease factor in AET) in the event that some overload
occurs within the cluster.
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Figure 5.5: Benign Failure Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 5.6: Benign Drop Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 5.7: Benign Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 5.8: Overall Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,15] sec)
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Figure 5.9: Benign Failure Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 5.10: Benign Drop Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 5.11: Benign Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Figure 5.12: Overall Success Rate (transport=TCP, benign call pickup time=[1,45] sec)
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Chapter 6
Distributed Accounting
Architecture
In this chapter, we will address the general problem of maintaining per-client accounting informa-
tion in distributed multimedia infrastructures. This accounting information can be used to enforce
system-wide policies, such as restricting the aggregate transaction state resource usage of individual
users to prevent Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks on SIP proxy server infrastructures. We will
present the details of the various components of our distributed accounting architecture including
everything from the high-level design to the underlying algorithms to the implementation. Fol-
lowing the infrastructure-as-a-service paradigm from cloud computing, our distributed accounting
architecture is used to build a scalable accounting service. Since accountability is such an important
security-related attribute in open environments, our goal is to offer accounting-as-a-service, which
can be reused for many different types of distributed multimedia applications to account for the
behavior of a large number of clients.
In a distributed multimedia service-hosting infrastructure comprising many geographically dis-
tributed nodes, each server S can easily observe its local interactions with clients and maintain local
accounting information on those interactions (e.g., client resource usage at S). However, in order to
enforce system-wide policies, each server will need aggregate accounting information from all of the
other servers in the system.
Aggregate accounting information in a distributed system has many useful applications. For
example, the problem of enforcing system-wide aggregate traffic limits across multiple sites for
hosted services within a computing cloud requires some cooperation between distributed rate limiters
located at each site [54]. Another useful application of aggregate accounting information would be
the prevention of request spreading attacks [67, 20, 19]. In a request spreading attack, some malicious
client C will deliberately spreads its requests across a large number of servers, such that each server
will not be able to individually detect the misbehavior of C on its own. However, if each server
could observe the aggregate behavior of C, then its misbehavior could be easily detected.
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6.1 Assumptions
Our distributed accounting architecture makes several assumptions. The first assumption is that we
assume that client interactions with the distributed multimedia service can be captured in the control
messages sent from the client to the various multimedia servers. For our distributed accounting
architecture, accountability involves holding a client C responsible for its aggregate behavior in the
entire system. This aggregate behavior is determined by C’s interactions with all multimedia servers
in the system.
Although clients might spread their requests across a large number of multimedia servers (i.e.,
request spreading may occur), the second assumption is that we assume that malicious clients cannot
hide their misbehavior by sending requests from an arbitrarily large number of different identities
(i.e., no Sybil attacks [24]). This assumption is reasonable for SIP-based multimedia services where
each client would be required to register with the service in order to obtain a valid SIP URI.
Finally, as we will explain in Section 6.2, we assume an infrastructure-centric environment that
hosts various multimedia services. In this system, our goal is to protect the hosted services, which
are assumed to be well-behaved, from potentially malicious external clients.
6.2 Target Environments
Our distributed accounting architecture targets distributed multimedia systems with an emphasis
on computing clouds deployed over the Internet and next-generation networks deployed by telecom-
munications service providers. Both target environments have been popular platforms for deploying
large-scale distributed multimedia applications. We briefly review the different environments in this
section before we present our detailed design.
6.2.1 Computing Clouds
Unlike completely decentralized peer-to-peer systems, computing clouds are infrastructure-centric
systems that offer various Web-based services. Our distributed accounting architecture specifically
considers Web-based multimedia services. The computing cloud environment is quite popular for de-
ploying applications because it does not require the procurement and maintenance of expensive cen-
tralized servers. Essentially, computing clouds enable the outsourcing of infrastructure-as-a-service
[54]. This utility computing model allows enterprises the flexibility to purchase cloud computing
resources as needed according to the demand for their Web applications. Examples of services
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available in computing clouds include content distribution, storage, and virtual machines [1]. Some
current cloud computing service providers include IBM Blue Cloud [5], Google App Engine [3], and
Amazon Web Services [1].
There are several uses for accounting in computing clouds. The first use would be customer
metered pricing and resource usage limiting [54]. As mentioned earlier, another use for account-
ing would be to prevent request spreading attacks where a client deliberately spreads its requests
throughout the system to avoid the detection of its excessive resource consumption [67]. One final use
would be trust management for server-side access control for various services dispersed throughout
the cloud [18].
6.2.2 IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is an architecture proposed by the Third Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) for providing Internet-based multimedia services on cellular networks [14].
The IMS architecture is expected to play a major role in next-generation networks deployed by
telecommunications service providers. The Session Initiation Protocol was chosen as the session
creation and management protocol for the IMS [56]. Similar to computing clouds, the IMS will
offer many different types of services from cellular phone service providers to end users. However,
unlike computing clouds, the IMS business model is not focused on providing a platform to deploy
applications from end users (although it is possible to incorporate third-party applications in an IMS
deployment). Some example services deployed over IMS are telephony, instant messaging, presence,
and media streaming.
There are several uses for accounting in the IMS. Telecommunications service providers deploying
IMS-based systems are very interested tracking resource usage for capacity planning, auditing, and
charging [14]. The IMS already has an accounting architecture defined for online and oﬄine charging.
Our distributed accounting architecture can complement existing accounting functionality in the
IMS by focusing on security-related accountability that might not necessarily be reflected in the
accounting information for online and oﬄine charging.
6.3 Per-Client Monitoring for Accounting
In our distributed accounting architecture, each server locally monitors client behavior. Locally
monitored client behavior at a multimedia server is represented as a ordered sequence of control
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APPEND:
// Message fields
client = client identifier
server = server identifier
ctrlmsg = original control message from client
response = optional response message from server
Table 6.1: APPEND Message Format
messages from the client to that server (and optionally the corresponding responses from the server
to the client). An example of such a control message from the Session Initiation Protocol would be
an INVITE request to initiate a multimedia communication session. Whenever a multimedia server
receives a control message from a particular client, the server will report the updated information
to the accounting service in the form of an APPEND message. The accounting service will then add
the control message (and possibly the response) to the sequence of messages from the client.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, for the multimedia services that we consider, we assume that
updates to the client’s behavior can be captured in the control messages sent by the client to the
various multimedia services. For example, the beginning or end of a multimedia session in the
Session Initiation Protocol can be detected by the corresponding INVITE and BYE messages from the
client. The format of APPEND messages sent from multimedia servers to the accounting service
appears in Table 6.1. The message fields include the following: (1) client that sent the request,
(2) server that received the request, (3) original control message from the client, and (4) optional
response message to the request if it’s available. When included, the optional response message
provides additional context on the outcome of the client’s request.
In terms of message integrity, the original control message ctrlmsg field from Table 6.1 is digitally
signed by the client. This digital signature allows the accounting service to verify that the client
actually sent the original control message to the specified multimedia server. The overall update
message is also digitally signed by the multimedia server that sent the update. This digital signature
allows the accounting service to verify that the multimedia server is the actual sender of the update.
The steps for updating monitored client behavior in the accounting service are enumerated in the
following list.
1. Multimedia server S receives control message {ctrlmsg}keyC from client C.
2. S possibly waits for optional response message to be generated for inclusion in APPEND
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message.
3. S sends APPEND message {A}keyS to accounting service AS.
6.4 Policy Enforcement
Based on the monitored client behavior described in Section 6.3, our distributed accounting service
enables system-wide policy enforcement in distributed environments. As mentioned in [54], system-
wide policies are often described in aggregate terms, rather than locally for each node in the system.
An example of an aggregate policy would be the following: client C cannot receive a bitrate higher
than 100 Mbps from the overall video-on-demand (VoD) infrastructure. Some examples of local
policies for each node would be client C cannot receive a bitrate higher than 15 Mbps from VoD
server S1 and 25 Mbps from VoD server S2. Although the policy in the latter case enables servers
to make local decisions for admission control, in practice, it would be prohibitive for a system
administrator to maintain N individual policies for N different servers.
The accounting service enables servers hosted within the multimedia infrastructure to obtain an
overall view of client behavior to make admission control decisions based on policies specified in
aggregate terms. Whenever server S wants to enforce some specified policy P for some client C, S
will send a QUERY request to the accounting service AS to evaluate C according to P . P might
be a local policy specific to S or a system-wide policy to be enforced by all servers. The result of
evaluating C according to P is a set of one or more attributes attrs that can be used by S to make
an admission control decision. An example attribute might include aggregate data rate. AS will
send the resulting attributes attrs to S in a RESULT message. The QUERY message from S to AS
contains the following fields: (1) client to be evaluated, (2) server making the evaluation request,
and (3) policy to be enforced on behalf of the server. The query message format is shown in Table
6.2. The RESULT message from AS to S contains the following fields: (1) evaluated client, (2)
server that made the original evaluation request, (3) policy used for evaluation, and (4) resulting
attribute vector. The result message format is shown in Table 6.3. The steps for evaluating a client
according to a specified policy are enumerated in the following list.
1. Multimedia server S sends QUERY message {Q}keyS identifying client C and policy P to
accounting service AS.
2. AS replies with resulting attribute vector attrsC for C according to P in RESULT message
{R}keyAS .
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QUERY:
// Message fields
client = client identifier
server = server identifier
policy = policy
Table 6.2: QUERY Message Format
RESULT:
// Message fields
client = client identifier
server = server identifier
policy = policy
attrs = resulting attributes
Table 6.3: RESULT Message Format
The accounting service sends the attribute vector as a summary of the monitored client behavior
according to the specified policy. The accounting service can be audited to verify the correctness of
the resulting attribute vector by inspecting the digitally signed updates received from the multimedia
servers, which contain the digitally signed control messages sent by the monitored clients.
6.5 Membership Management
In our distributed accounting architecture, we assume that every accounting node is assigned a node
identifier taken from a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-1 or MD5) of its IP address and port. This is a
common node identifier assignment scheme used by some distributed hash tables [57, 29]. In terms
of membership, we assume that each accounting node maintains global membership information
with the node identifier and corresponding IP address and port of every other accounting node in
the system.
We consider two different approaches to maintaining global membership. In the first approach,
for a small number of nodes implementing the accounting service, one or more directory servers can
collectively maintain global membership information by having accounting service nodes periodically
send heartbeats to the directory servers. The accounting service nodes will also periodically retrieve
the global list. In the second approach, for a large number of nodes implementing the account-
ing service, membership information is exchanged between accounting servers and disseminated to
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multimedia servers periodically using gossip-based protocols, such as [23].
Although global membership would not be feasible for a system comprising millions of nodes, our
accounting service is not expected to include more than thousands of nodes, which is a reasonable
size for global membership maintenance. We argue that most distributed multimedia infrastructures
could be sufficiently monitored by thousands of accounting service nodes. For example, in 2005,
Akamai reported that their content delivery network included 15,000+ servers [61]. Even if we were
to double that number for today, the ratio of multimedia servers to accounting nodes would still be
a reasonable 30:1 if we assume 1000 accounting nodes.
6.6 Load Balancing
Multiple nodes collectively provide the accounting service to enhance scalability. Multiple nodes
are necessary due to the potentially large number of multimedia servers handling requests from an
even larger number of clients. In this section, we discuss how load balancing is handled for our
distributed accounting architecture.
Consistent hashing is used to deterministically map a request to one of the multiple accounting
service nodes. One of the major benefits of consistent hashing is that adding or removing one
accounting service node does not significantly alter the mapping of requests to accounting service
nodes. Consistent hashing has previously been used for some distributed hash tables [42, 63, 57, 29,
73]. Our specific application of consistent hashing, which would be done at the multimedia servers
handling requests from clients, is shown in Table 6.4. Essentially, our organization is a distributed
hash table with global membership maintained at each node (i.e., one-hop lookups).
Assuming that our consistent hashing uses a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-1 or MD5)
to generate hash values of the client identifiers, the assignment of clients to accounting service nodes
should be approximately uniformly distributed for load balancing as long as the circular distance
between each accounting node identifier is also approximately uniform. Also, as explained in Section
6.5, we assume that every multimedia server has global membership information.
6.7 Availability
Multiple nodes are also needed to enhance availability. Replication is needed due to the possibility
of node failures. If an accounting node crashes, all of the accounting information for clients mapped
to that particular node is lost. Without the lost accounting information, multimedia servers will
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Input parameters:
R = either an append or query request sent from server to accounting service
M = global membership containing all accounting service node identifiers
ConsistentHash(R,M):
// Map R to responsible accounting service node
// (based on key partitioning from Chord distributed hash table)
C = R.client
nodeId = accounting service node responsible for R (initially null)
hash = CRYPTO-HASH(C)
if ∀ m  M (hash > m)
nodeId = MINIMUM(M)
else
M ′ = { m : m  M and m ≥ hash }
nodeId = MINIMUM(M ′)
RETURN nodeId
Table 6.4: Consistent Hashing
0
4
8
12
SUCCESSOR(4) = 8
SUCCESSOR(8) = 12
SUCCESSOR(12) = 0
SUCCESSOR(0) = 4
HASH VALUE
ACCOUNTING
SERVICE NODE
HASH(C) = 10
ASSIGN(C) = 12
HASH(D) = 15
ASSIGN(D) = 0
HASH(A) = 1
ASSIGN(A) = 4
HASH(B) = 3
ASSIGN(B) = 4
Figure 6.1: Distributed Hash Table
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not be able to evaluate client behavior against system policies. In this section, we discuss how
availability is handled.
Borrowing another technique from distributed hash tables, we utilize replication on successor
nodes to enhance availability [63]. Based on the consistent hashing scheme described in Table 6.4,
notice that our accounting nodes are organized into a circular identifier space. The successor of
each accounting node is its immediate neighbor in the clockwise direction. Figure 6.1 depicts our
distributed hash table, which shows how hash values are assigned to accounting service nodes for
load balancing as well as successor replication.
In a system with N accounting nodes, successor replication can be supported on k nodes where
k is the replication factor and 0 < k ≤ N − 1. Whenever a multimedia server S receives a control
message from a client, it will send the corresponding APPEND request (as described in Section 6.3)
to the primary accounting node AS responsible for storing the update based on the consistent hash
defined in Table 6.4. In addition to updating AS, S will also update the k successors of AS in the
circular identifier space. Whenever a multimedia server S wants to evaluate a client’s behavior, it
will send the corresponding QUERY request (as described in Section 6.4) to the primary accounting
node AS responsible according to the consistent hash. If the primary node fails to respond, S will
try up to k successors in sequence until it gets a query response.
If we define fault tolerance as the number of server failures that can be tolerated before some
accounting information is lost, then the fault tolerance of successor replication is equal to replication
factor k. In a system where each accounting node has failure probability p and replication factor k,
the probability of successfully looking up accounting information for a particular client is 1− pk.
6.8 Implementation
To enable easy integration with distributed multimedia infrastructures running applications that al-
ready use the Session Initiation Protocol for their control and management planes (e.g., IMS-based
networks), we implemented our distributed accounting architecture as a SIP-based accounting ser-
vice. We also implemented a SIP-based directory service to maintain global membership information
for the accounting service nodes as described in Section 6.5. Our accounting service can be used in
one of the two following modes: (1) standalone SIP application server, and (2) SIP proxy server in
the control message path. The JAIN SIP stack was used to implement our SIP accounting nodes
with the necessary SIP accounting service extensions [7].
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SIP Request Methods Description
ADDMEMBER Send membership information to directory service
GETMEMBERS Retrieve membership information from directory service
APPEND Update accounting service with new client record (Table 6.1)
QUERY Evaluate client according to policy (Table 6.2)
Table 6.5: SIP Accounting Service Extensions
As described in Section 6.5, our distributed accounting architecture assumes global membership
for the accounting service nodes. The two SIP extension methods that we add to send and retrieve
membership information are ADDMEMBER and GETMEMBERS, which are defined in Table 6.5. The
message content body of the ADDMEMBER request message contains the IP address and port of the
corresponding accounting service node reporting its membership information. The message content
body of the response to a GETMEMBERS request message will contain a list of IP addresses and ports
for the corresponding accounting service nodes.
Our accounting service nodes can act as standalone SIP application servers that use the SIP
message extensions that we define in Table 6.5. The multimedia servers reporting client behavior can
be thought of as accounting service clients to the servers that collectively implement the accounting
services. Specifically, the multimedia servers only send APPEND and QUERY SIP request messages
to the accounting service nodes. The accounting service nodes will typically respond with 200 OK
SIP response messages. The message content bodies of the APPEND and QUERY requests contain
the message fields from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Upon receiving a QUERY request, the
accounting service nodes will piggyback the resulting attributes in the message content body of the
corresponding 200 OK SIP response to the SIP request. Therefore, the message content bodies of
the 200 OK responses to QUERY requests contain the message fields from Table 6.3.
For application scenarios that might benefit from having an accounting service directly in the
signaling path (e.g., SIP call establishment), our accounting service nodes can also act as an interme-
diate SIP proxy server in the control plane that observes all requests and responses during a session
operation. Specifically, a multimedia server can add a Route header containing the IP address and
port of an accounting service node in order to force control messages to be routed through that
accounting service node. The multimedia server can also piggyback additional information, such
as evaluation policy for queries, along with the routed request. When the accounting service node
receives a control message, it will add a Via header containing its IP address and port before for-
warding the control message in order to receive the corresponding response to the control message.
The accounting service node could also piggyback additional information in forwarded responses,
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such as resulting attributes from a query request. By forcing SIP requests and responses through
an accounting service node, the accounting service can observe client behavior implicitly.
79
Chapter 7
Trust Management Framework
Reputation-based trust management is a service that can be built on top of middleware that main-
tains accountability information. In open distributed environments, reputation-based trust manage-
ment systems enable one party to evaluate the trust of another unknown party based on the previous
transactions of the unknown party with others [71, 12]. The reputation of the unknown party can
determine whether or not it meets a minimum trust threshold for future interactions. For exam-
ple, many participants in online auction sites decide whether or not to enter into transactions with
buyers or sellers based on their reputations [2]. Over the past few years, many reputation systems
have emerged for applications ranging from e-commerce to Web service selection to peer-to-peer file
sharing [71, 12, 21, 30, 40, 72, 39, 68, 52].
In this chapter, we present a reputation-based trust management framework that supports the
synthesis of trust-related feedback from many different entities while also providing each entity
with the flexibility to apply different scoring functions over the same feedback data for customized
trust evaluations. Although our approach is applicable to a wide variety of application scenarios
(e.g., Web services [18]), for our performance evaluation at the end of this chapter, we tested the
implementation of our trust management framework on a realistic application scenario involving a
SIP-based VoIP infrastructure.
7.1 Problem Description
Many reputation management systems have been developed under the assumption that each entity
in the system will use a variant of the same scoring function. Although previous work on existing
reputation systems has explored the efficacy and robustness of particular reputation scoring functions
as well as algorithms for reputation management in completely decentralized environments, very
little attention has been given to supporting the synthesis of feedback from multiple entities while
also supporting the use of different reputation scoring functions by different entities over the same
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feedback data. Such flexibility in choosing reputation scoring functions would be desirable in an
open infrastructure-centric environment hosting many services with different requirements for trust.
For the case of distributed multimedia services, consider an IMS-based infrastructure hosting
many different SIP-based services [14]. In such an environment, each service might have its own
individual reputation-based trust metrics that it wants to apply to external clients when deciding
whether or not to process a request or perform a service on behalf of a client. For example, a voice-
over-IP service might consider different trust-related attributes compared to an instant messaging
service or a video streaming service. Also, two different service providers for the same type of service
might have different notions of trust.
Similar to completely decentralized environments, infrastructure-centric environments might also
require scalability. However, infrastructure-centric environments do not have the additional require-
ment for complete decentralization, which presents the opportunity to offer reputation-based trust
management as an infrastructure service distributed over multiple nodes. Offering trust management
as an infrastructure service will simplify the task of evaluating a client’s trust level by application
developers.
In a large-scale infrastructure hosting many different services (such as [4, 3, 14]), assessing the
level of trust in incoming requests can enhance the protection of the services by identifying requests
from clients with poor transaction histories. The identification of such clients can facilitate server-
side access control. In an open system without credentials issued to clients (i.e., credential-based
trust management, such as [13], is not an option), reputation-based trust management allows services
to make trust level assessments based on the previous behavior of a client. Specifically, services
within the infrastructure should be able to deny requests from clients with a history of initiating
bad transactions at one or more other services.
7.2 Assumptions
Before discussing the details of our trust management framework, we should briefly review several
assumptions that we make. The first assumption that we make is that clients do not mask their
malicious behavior by spreading it across an unlimited number of identities (i.e., no Sybil attacks
[24]). This assumption follows from the assumptions in our distributed accounting architecture
introduced in Section 6.1. This assumption is also common to many reputation management systems
[68, 21].
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The second assumption that we make is that there is secure communication between the hosted
services and the trust management service instances. For secure communication between services,
the infrastructure hosting the services can issue digital certificates to each service and trust manage-
ment service instance to enable public key cryptography for confidentiality and authentication. This
would prevent clients from impersonating a legitimate service to report false feedback or initiate a
flood of trust evaluation requests.
Since our framework is based on reputations computed over client transaction histories, our
attack model only considers attacks that can be characterized by a sequence of requests sent from a
client. Attacks based on deviations from the underlying applications’ protocols, such as malformed
requests that crash the service nodes, are outside the scope of our trust management framework.
7.3 Overview
To enable services to make customized trust level assessments of incoming requests from clients
based on shared information about that client’s previous interactions with other services, we have
designed and implemented a reputation-based trust management framework. Our trust management
framework, which is built on top of our distributed accounting architecture, stores information on
previous service interactions with clients and allows services to compute their own customized rep-
utation scoring functions over the transaction history collected. Specifically, we make the following
contributions:
1. Support for multiple trust evaluation metrics: Since different services might apply different
trust evaluation metrics, we developed a trust management service that supports multiple
reputation scoring functions over the same trust-related feedback shared from multiple services.
2. Usable API for application developers: The API for our trust management service provides
methods for reporting feedback and evaluating trust over the synthesized trust data. The trust
management service frees application developers from writing their own trust management
software components.
3. Service implementation, deployment, and evaluation: Our trust management service has been
implemented and deployed in a distributed environment comprising several nodes with a real-
istic SIP-based application scenario.
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Service Example Record
Voice-over-IP Voip ( C, Voip, INVITE, 200 OK )
Registrar Rgr ( C, Rgr, REGISTER, 200 OK )
Presence Prsn ( C, Prsn, SUBSCRIBE, 200 OK )
Table 7.1: Service Invocation History Records
Our trust management service (TMS) synthesizes trust-related feedback reported from multiple
services based on their previous interactions with clients. Unlike many reputation systems that
consider a single distributed application with a single reputation-based trust metric, the TMS allows
each service to make trust level assessments with its own individual custom reputation scoring
function.
7.4 Collecting Feedback
Using our distributed accounting architecture introduced in Chapter 6, in our trust management
framework, the past behavior of a client is represented as a collection of service invocation history
records stored collectively among all the TMS nodes. Service invocation history records are created
from monitoring the series of request messages (and optionally the responses) sent from the clients
to the multimedia servers hosted within the infrastructure.
Whenever a client C sends a request in the form of a control message ctrlmsg to a multimedia
server S, S will report ctrlmsg and optionally its response to our trust management service as an
APPEND request A. The format of the APPEND request message appears in Table 6.1. The
process of collecting feedback in the form of APPEND request messages is described in more detail
in 6.3.
Since many different types of multimedia services might be hosted within the distributed service-
hosting infrastructure, many different types of client requests will be reported to the TMS. For
example, an Internet telephony service might report messages indicating the beginning and end of a
voice-over-IP call. A registration service might report messages indicating the current network loca-
tion of a mobile telephone user. A presence service might report messages indicating the availability
of a client for an interactive instant messaging session. Some example service invocation history
records for these three scenarios appear in Table 7.1.
In the service infrastructure, each service has a partial view of client behavior based on its local
interactions with each client. By reporting feedback to the TMS, each service can share information
on these local interactions. Each client’s aggregate behavior will then be available for reputation-
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based trust level evaluations by all services.
7.5 Assessing Trust
Since each service hosted within the infrastructure might have its own individual notion of trust for
external clients, services supply their custom reputation scoring functions to be evaluated by the
TMS using the service invocation history records stored at the TMS. The reputation metrics should
be defined over a collection of service invocation history records. In addition to the client identifier C
and service S reporting the invocation history record, the reputation scoring functions can consider
the content and headers of the control messages along with their responses stored within the TMS.
Based on the reputation score computed, services can determine whether or not the reputation of
the client making the request exceeds its minimal trust threshold to grant the request.
Whenever a server S wants to evaluate some client C according to a custom reputation metric
P , S will send a tuple (C,S,P ) to our trust management service as an QUERY request Q. The
format of the QUERY request message appears in Table 6.2. Here, the reputation metric P along
with the minimum trust threshold at S represents the policy to be enforced. The process of policy
enforcement with QUERY request messages is described in more detail in 6.4.
Since feedback on all client transactions is stored at the TMS, each service can apply its own
reputation scoring function to an aggregate view of a client’s overall behavior rather than being
restricted to a partial view based on the service’s local interactions. By storing the control messages
(and optionally the responses), information becomes available for many different types of multimedia
services for custom reputation evaluations.
7.6 Customizing Reputation
Since many reputation systems only consider a single application with a single reputation metric,
one of our primary goals was to allow services to compute their own customized reputation scoring
functions over all of the trust-related feedback data collected by the TMS from different types of
services. This would allow services with different trust requirements to make different trust level
assessments for a client with the same given behavior as reported from a large number of different
services.
The example in Table 7.2 illustrates how two different scoring functions can be used to make
different trust level assessments by two services W and X over the same transaction history data
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Customization
FW (C) =
∑
INVITE−∑ CANCEL for all requests from C
FX(C) =
∑
INVITE−∑ CANCEL for all requests from C to N
Minimum trust threshold TW = 0
Minimum trust threshold TX = 1
TMS record U1:(C,M ,INVITE,200 OK)
TMS record U2:(C,N ,CANCEL,200 OK)
TMS record U3:(C,P ,INVITE,200 OK)
TMS record U4:(C,N ,INVITE,200 OK)
FW (C) = 3− 1 = 2, so W will grant request to C
FX(C) = 1− 1 = 0, so X will deny request to C
Table 7.2: Customizing Reputation
for some client C, who has previously invoked services M , N , and P . In this SIP-based example,
both scoring functions consider the number of INVITE and CANCEL requests from each client. An
INVITE request indicates that a session initiation was attempted while a CANCEL request indicates
the cancellation of a session initiation request. A client issuing a disproportionately large number
of cancellations might indicate a waste of call setup resources for a voice-over-IP service provider
without providing an opportunity to collect revenue during a call after session establishment.
In Table 7.2, service W and X arrive at two different access control decisions based on the same
transaction history for client C. The reason for these two different trust level assessments is that
W wants to consider all transactions while X is only interested in transactions involving service N .
As explained in this section, our trust management framework is designed to support differ-
ent services using different reputation metrics. To provide some concrete examples of contrasting
reputation metrics, we will briefly review two well-known reputation metrics, eBay and PeerTrust.
Both buyers and sellers are allowed to provide feedback on their auction transactions with other
buyers and sellers on eBay [2]. The eBay scoring function is a summation of positive (+1), neutral
(0), and negative (−1) feedback values used for the online auction site. Users with higher eBay scores
are considered to have higher reputations. The eBay feedback ratings are added up to determine
a client’s overall reputation according to the eBay scoring function. This overall reputation can be
used by potential buyers and sellers to determine whether or not to purchase/sell an item from/to
another eBay user.
PeerTrust is a reputation management system for peer-to-peer networks [68]. The PeerTrust
model presents a trust metric based on the following five features: feedback from other peers,
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number of transactions completed, credibility of feedback, transaction context factor, and community
context factor. The transaction context factor represents the importance of the transaction (e.g.,
transactions involving more money should receive more weight). The community context factor
represents ”community-specific” information that should be taken into account (e.g., willingness to
provide feedback to benefit the overall community).
The general trust metric T (u) for some peer u appears in the following Equation 7.1 from [68].
T (u) = α ·
I(u)∑
i=1
S(u, i) · Cr(p(u, i)) · TF (u, i) + β · CF (u) (7.1)
I(u) represents the total number of transactions performed by some peer u with other peers in
a given time window and p(u, i) represents the other peer in the ith transaction of peer u. S(u, i)
denotes the normalized amount of user satisfaction peer u receives from p(u, i) in its ith transaction.
Cr(v) denotes the credibility of feedback received from peer v. TF (u, i) denotes the adaptive
transaction context factor for peer u’s ith transaction and CF (u) denotes the adaptive community
factor. The variables α and β are weight factors.
7.7 Application Programming Interface
In this section, we will briefly present the external application programming interface to the TMS,
which will be used by the multimedia services for server-side access control. The TMS API consists
of two simple methods: append() and query(). The method append() can be run by a multimedia
service after processing a request from a client. The method query() can be run by a multimedia
service in order to make a server-side access control decision for a request from a client. The
parameters to append() correspond to the parameters for APPEND messages, which are shown in
Table 6.1, in our distributed accounting architecture. The parameters to query() correspond to
the parameters for QUERY messages, which are shown in Table 6.2. For our trust management
framework, we assume that local and system-wide policies in the QUERY messages are represented
by scoring functions.
append( Client id, Service S, ControlMessage ctrlmsg, Response response );
query( Client id, Service S, ScoringFunction function );
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Figure 7.1: SIP Call Establishment Scenario Enhanced with TMS
7.8 Performance Evaluation
The problem of mitigating the effects of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks on SIP-based VoIP
deployments discussed in Chapter 3 can also be reduced to a reputation-based trust management
problem. To apply our framework to this problem, a VoIP provider could use our trust management
service in proxy operation mode. Essentially, by inserting the trust management service into the
signaling path, user agent clients that repeatedly initiate phone calls with long ringing times can
be identified by assigning lower reputations to them. For example, a VoIP provider could apply the
eBay scoring function described in Section 7.6 over the client transaction history assigning positive
feedback to all calls with ringing times less than 30 seconds, neutral feedback for calls ringing
between 30 and 60 seconds, and negative feedback for calls ringing over 60 seconds. Alternatively,
a VoIP provider could apply the PeerTrust scoring function described in Section 7.6 over the client
transaction history assigning a satisfaction factor inversely proportional to the ringing time. The
effectiveness of these approaches to protect SIP-based VoIP deployments from Ringing-based denial-
of-service attacks depends on the particular scoring function used.
In this section, we will investigate the performance of our trust management framework by
evaluating an implementation of our trust management service in both LAN andWAN environments.
Our trust management service implementation was integrated with a VoIP application. As shown
in the simplified call establishment scenario in Figure 7.1, inserting our trust management service
into the signaling path for call establishment from VoIP providers involves at least one additional
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Figure 7.2: Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed Experimental Setup
hop at the SIP application layer. The possibility of creating a bottleneck is also present depending
on the number of trust management service nodes. Therefore, we measure both the throughput and
latency with and without the TMS to determine the overhead.
7.8.1 Experimental Setup
For our first set of experiments, we used eight machines connected over a local area network. In
addition to the two machines belonging to our research group, we used six nodes from the Illinois
Cloud Computing Testbed (CCT) [6]. One local machine ran emulated SIPp user agent clients
(UACs) that sent session initiation requests (i.e., INVITE) to begin a phone call. The other local
machine ran emulated SIPp user agent servers (UASs) that received the requests and sent responses.
Three CCT nodes were used to run SIP proxy servers and the other three CCT nodes were used
to run TMS proxy servers in the signaling path. For each experimental run, we varied the number
of TMS proxies from 0 to 3. A detailed picture of our experimental set up for LAN environments
appears in Figure 7.2.
For our second set of experiments, we used twelve machines connected over a wide area network.
Each machine belonged to the PlanetLab network testbed [9]. Three machines ran emulated SIPp
user agent clients (UACs) that sent session initiation requests (i.e., INVITE requests) at the beginning
of a phone call. Three other machines ran emulated SIPp user agent servers (UASs) that received
the requests and sent responses. Three machines ran one SIP proxy server per machine. Another
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Figure 7.3: PlanetLab Experimental Setup
three machines ran one TMS proxy server per machine. For each experimental run, we varied the
number of TMS proxies from 0 to 3. We made a total of five experimental runs for each experimental
configuration (e.g., five runs with zero TMS nodes and so on). A detailed picture of our experimental
set up for WAN environments appears in Figure 7.3.
7.8.2 Workload Characteristics
In the first set of experiments on the Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed, we were concerned with
measuring throughput and average response time for different incoming call rates. For each configu-
ration (i.e., different number of TMS nodes), we gradually increased the incoming call rate from the
emulated SIPp user agent clients until the measured throughput no longer increased. Depending on
the configuration, the number of hops traversed for each control message was either two or three.
If the number of TMS nodes in the experimental run was equal to zero, then control messages only
passed through the SIP proxy. If the number of TMS nodes in the experimental run was greater
than zero, then control messages passed through both the SIP proxy and one TMS proxy.
In the first set of experiments, we used two different call pickup time distributions. In order to
measure the maximum throughput with negligible ring time delay, the ringing time delay was set
to zero at the emulated SIPp user agent servers for one run of experiments in the first set. In order
to measure the maximum throughput with a realistic ring time delay, the ringing time delay was
uniformly distributed between 1 and 15 seconds at the emulated SIPp user agent servers for another
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run of experiments in the first set. Our negligible ring time delay in the first run allows us to further
stress the system and measure latency without considering call pickup time delay. Our realistic call
pickup delay in the second run allows us to observe more realistic response times that consider call
pickup time delays.
For the second set of experiments on PlanetLab, we had each one of the emulated SIPp user
agent client machines make calls at a rate of 5 calls per second to another emulated SIPp user agent
server via a single SIP proxy server. If the number of TMS nodes in the experiment was greater than
zero, rather than directly forwarding control messages to the user agent servers, the SIP proxy server
would forward all call signaling messages to the responsible TMS node according to a consistent
hash of the user agent client’s SIP URI as described in Section 6.6. Consistent hashing of a client’s
SIP URI ensures that all of its control messages will pass through the same TMS node. On the
receiving end of the calls, the user agent servers would pick up (i.e., sending a final response) with
a uniform distribution of ringing times between 1 and 15 seconds. This is similar to the benign call
ringing time behavior described in Section 4.4.
The scoring function used in our experiments was a variant of the eBay scoring function where a
200 OK final response receives a +1 and 603 Decline response receives a −1. We used an extremely
low minimal trust threshold at the SIP proxy servers of the VoIP providers to avoid excluding user
agent clients from the experiment in an effort to keep the workload as high as possible since we are
focusing on the performance of the trust management service rather than the effectiveness of the
scoring functions, which is outside the scope of our work.
7.8.3 Metrics
In order to evaluate the performance of our trust management service, we considered the following
two metrics: (1) throughput of the system with and without the TMS, and (2) average response
time experienced at the callers with and without the TMS. Throughput was only measured on
the Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed since full control of the machine is necessary for accurate
measurements. The throughput is the maximum sustainable call rate, which is measured in calls per
second. Response time was measured on both the Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed and PlanetLab.
The Illinois Cloud Computing Testbed response times directly reflect the additional latency caused
by using the TMS as well as the dramatic increase in response time when the system reaches capacity.
The PlanetLab response times reflect the additional latency when using the TMS with realistic call
pickup time distributions. The response time was the number of seconds between a caller sending a
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Figure 7.4: Throughput with Negligible Call Pickup Times (LAN Environment)
Number of TMS Nodes Maximum Throughput (calls per second)
0 3689.47
1 1798.29
2 3193.20
3 3394.32
Table 7.3: Maximum Call Throughput with Negligible Call Pickup Times (LAN Environment)
session initiation request (i.e., INVITE) and receiving a final response (i.e., 200 OK or 603 Decline)
from the callee at the other end.
7.8.4 Discussion of Results
As shown by the measured throughput in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 as well as the maximum throughput in
Tables 7.3 and 7.4, the TMS does have an impact on throughput in our experiments on the Illinois
Cloud Computing Testbed. Specifically, if only one TMS node is used, it becomes a bottleneck
Number of TMS Nodes Maximum Throughput (calls per second)
0 2777.06
1 1965.13
2 2398.54
3 2523.14
Table 7.4: Maximum Call Throughput with Realistic Call Pickup Times (LAN Environment)
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and reduces the maximum sustainable call rate by over half with negligible call pickup time delays.
The reduction in throughput when one TMS node is used is approximately 30% with realistic call
pickup time delays. However, when using two TMS nodes with negligible call pickup time delays,
the maximum throughput is 87% of the maximum throughput when the TMS is not used. Similarly,
when using three TMS nodes with negligible call pickup time delays, the maximum throughput is
92% of the maximum throughput when the TMS is not used. Similar improvements can be seen
with realistic call pickup time delays. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show how the average response times
dramatically increase when the system has reached or exceeded its maximum sustainable capacity.
As shown by the average response times experienced at the callers in Figure 7.8, the overall
end-to-end average response time does not significantly increase when the trust management service
is utilized in the signaling path of call establishment. The midpoint of the call pickup time range
in our experiments is 8 seconds, which appears to be the dominant factor in the response times in
Figure 7.8. As reported by Bell Labs in October 1974, the average ringing time of a phone call
was 8.5 seconds [25]. In terms of response time, the trust management service does not seem to
have a major impact on multimedia applications where human actions are the dominant cost in
determining the time it takes to receive responses to control messages (e.g., VoIP or IM).
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Chapter 8
Related Work
In this chapter, we will review some of the previous work related to the contributions made in this
dissertation. First, we will cover some general techniques that have been developed for Internet-
based denial-of-service attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks that specifically target SIP proxy
servers. Next, we will present some of the related work on maintaining accountability in distributed
systems. Finally, we will review some related approaches on distributed rate limiting and trust
management.
8.1 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack Mitigation and
Prevention
The problem of malicious transaction state overload caused by Ringing-based denial-of-service at-
tacks that we consider throughout this dissertation is actually a type of application-layer denial-
of-service (DoS) attack. In this section, we will discuss some related approaches for mitigating or
preventing denial-of-service attacks for the general Internet at both the network and application
layers. We will also review some DoS mitigation and prevention specifically designed for SIP proxy
servers.
8.1.1 Network-Layer
Denial-of-service attacks have been a problem on the Internet for quite some time. Disrupting a
Web server for a long period of time could have significant consequences, especially in the case of
e-commerce or governmental servers. Moore et al. developed a new technique called ”backscatter
analysis” to characterize the prevalence of DoS attacks on the global Internet [48]. In a short two-
week period, their study found over 12,000 flooding-based attacks on over 5,000 hosts belonging to
more than 2,000 organizations. Flooding-based attacks are difficult to defend against, because they
overwhelm the target with seemingly legitimate requests.
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Park and Lee proposed route-based distributed packet filtering to drop a large fraction of spoofed
IP packets before they reach their destinations and to localize the true origin of the spoofed packets
that make it through their filter [51]. Using routing topology information, border routers in an
autonomous system will essentially drop packets whose source addresses indicate that their packets
should not enter through a particular link. IP spoofing is a technique commonly used during DoS
attacks to avoid accountability.
Ioannidis and Bellovin proposed router-based ”pushback” to defend against distributed denial-
of-service attacks on the Internet [35]. In their approach, routers first try to identify packets that
probably belong to an attack and drop those packets. Then, downstream routers will notify upstream
routers to also preferentially drop such packets to free up resources for legitimate traffic.
Wang et al. utilize sequential change point detection at leaf routers connecting end hosts to
the Internet to detect TCP SYN flooding attacks based on observing the number of SYN and FIN
(RST) packets during each period [66]. TCP SYN flooding involves sending spoofed SYN requests
to a victim server to create many half-open TCP connections at that server, which will not receive
the final ACK from the spoofed client. Since the limit on the number of half-open connections is
finite, TCP SYN flooding makes resources unavailable for TCP connections from legitimate clients.
Jin et al. employ an approach at a single Internet server based on hop-count filtering, which
involves the server filtering packets based on a mapping between IP addresses and their expected
number of hops to the server [37]. The hop count is inferred from the TTL value in the IP header.
Hop-count filtering at a single server is analogous to route-based distributed packet filtering at border
routers. In both cases, routing information is used to drop suspicious traffic. However, hop-count
filtering only needs to be deployed at the potential victim host, rather than several border routers.
8.1.2 Application-Layer
Daswani and Garcia-Molina examined the effects of different overlay network topologies and load
balancing strategies on the prevention of application-layer DoS attacks that flood the Gnutella
protocol with queries [22]. Their study was one of the first to focus on denial-of-service attacks in
peer-to-peer systems at the application layer. Application-layer DoS attacks often involve much less
effort on the part of the attacker compared to network-layer DoS attacks.
In contrast to many network-based DoS attacks on bandwidth availability, Kandula et al. ob-
served that botnets comprising tens of thousands of zombies are commonly targeting victim resources
(e.g., CPU, database, and disk bandwidth) at the application-layer [41]. As a result, the authors pro-
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posed a scheme for authentication using graphical tests to protect Web servers from DDoS attacks
that masquerade as flash crowds.
Walfish et al. propose an approach to application-layer distributed DoS defense by encouraging
legitimate clients to increase their volume of traffic to the victim server during an attack [65]. Their
reasoning is that bad clients are already exhausting their upload bandwidth capacity to execute the
attack while good clients should have spare upload bandwidth.
Srivatsa et al. also consider application-layer DoS attacks on Web servers that target specific
application semantics [62]. Such attacks are difficult to detect because the underlying network
traffic pattern might not exhibit any significant changes. Their approach performs admission control
by port hiding and congestion control by adaptively adjusting a client’s priority level to mitigate
application-layer DoS attacks.
8.1.3 SIP Proxy Servers
To the best of our knowledge, previous work on protecting SIP proxy servers from DoS attacks
has only considered flooding-based attacks [55, 60]. In particular, the type of previously considered
flooding-based attack involves sending INVITE requests at a rate high enough to overwhelm the
network bandwidth and processing resources of the targeted SIP proxy attempting to process all of
the requests.
Similar to [66], Reynolds and Ghosal use sequential change point detection to detect application-
layer flooding DoS attacks on SIP proxy servers [55]. Their approach observes pairs of INVITE and
200 OK SIP method requests and responses during each period to detect flooding, rather than SYN
and FIN (RST) packets.
Sengar et al. utilize anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect application-layer flooding DoS
attacks on SIP proxy servers [60]. In their approach, they statistically characterize the ”normal”
protocol by profiling the number of SIP request and response types transmitted during a particular
period. Attacks are detected when the traffic profile deviates from normal behavior.
Hilt and Widjaja introduce some distributed overload control mechanisms to handle the problem
of message processing overload in SIP proxy servers [33]. Their mechanisms neither consider denial-
of-service attacks nor transaction state overload.
Unlike a flooding-based attack or message overload, the Ringing-based DoS attack that we
considered in this dissertation only involves exploiting the semantics of the SIP protocol to exhaust
resources at the stateful proxy. The Ringing-based DoS attack does not require malicious UACs
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to flood the proxy and would not be detected using previous solutions designed for flooding-based
attacks. Therefore, our contributions to protecting SIP proxy servers from Ringing-based DoS
attacks is complementary to previous flooding-based solutions.
Some previous work has also considered protecting emergency call services (e.g., dialing ’911’ in
the United States) in the PSTN from DoS attacks originating from VoIP networks [28]. Fuchs et al.
apply intrusion detection techniques at the emergency call center to address this problem.
8.2 Distributed Accounting
Distributed accounting has been used for resource allocation in network testbed infrastructures as
well as free-riding prevention in peer-to-peer systems. In this section, we will discuss some related
work in both categories as well as a general approach to accountability in distributed systems.
8.2.1 Resource Allocation
PlanetLab Central (PLC) is a trusted infrastructure service for the PlanetLab network testbed [16].
The PLC service maintains information on principles, slices, resource allocations, and policies in
a central database. The information in this central database can be used for accountability for
improper resource usage and to enforce resource usage policies. Obviously, a central database intro-
duces a bottleneck and central point of failure, which makes it unsuitable for large-scale distributed
systems.
SHARP is a distributed resource management alternative to the centralized PLC service [27].
Rather than maintaining a central database for accountability, each peer locally barters resource
claims by exchanging tickets with other peers in the system in order to access resources at remote
sites. Using public key cryptography, SHARP tickets are self-describing and self-certifying. This
allows the verification of resource claims as well as the detection of oversubscriptions (i.e., resource
provider issues conflicting tickets).
8.2.2 Free-Riding Prevention
KARMA is another distributed economic framework for secure peer-to-peer resource sharing [64]. It
was designed specifically with the intention of combating the free-riding problem that often occurs
in peer-to-peer systems when participants consume resources without contributing any resources in
return. In KARMA, for each peer in the system, a set of peers are assigned to keep track of its
98
resource consumption relative to its resource contributions as a single scalar value, which corresponds
to its karma.
Liebau et al. propose a token-based accounting scheme for participants to access resources in
peer-to-peer systems [46]. Token-based accounting also targets the free-riding problem. Similar to
the tickets used by SHARP [27], the tokens act as digitally signed receipts in transactions between
peers. Tokens collected by resource providers can be exchanged for new tokens.
Another solution to the free-riding problem with respect to fair sharing of bandwidth is Scrivener
developed by Nandi et al. [50]. Unlike the incentive-based content distribution used in BitTorrent
[17], Scrivener does not require pairwise swapping of content blocks, because it enables transitive
credit-debit exchanges through a path of one or more intermediate peers.
BAR gossip is a gossip-based protocol for peer-to-peer live data streaming in the presence of
selfish and malicious peers [44]. Similar to BitTorrent, peers exchange previously unseen updates
with each other. Cryptography is used to secure the pairwise exchanges between peers.
8.2.3 Rate Limiting
Distributed resource usage limiting is an important problem, especially in the context of computing
clouds or other service-hosting infrastructures. Raghavan et al. present an approach for distributed
rate limiting in computing clouds [54]. They present two algorithms: (1) a general technique for
enforcing global random packet drops, and (2) another mechanism specific to Web services that
utilizes knowledge about TCP congestion control behavior.
8.2.4 General Accountability
PeerReview is a general system for maintaining accountability in distributed systems [31]. Each
peer node maintains a log of sent and received messages as well as the inputs and outputs of the
application. Using a specification of expected behavior, any other peer node can audit another peer
node’s log to detect faults and deviations from a given protocol.
8.3 Trust Management
Much previous research has been done on trust management in general and reputation-based trust
management systems in applications ranging from online auctions to Web service selection to peer-
to-peer networks.
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8.3.1 Credential-based Trust Management
Blaze et al. developed a framework to address the general problem of trust management in a man-
ner independent of the underlying application or service [13]. Their trust management framework
enables users to specify security policies, security credentials, and trust relationships in an expres-
sive language. PolicyMaker, which is the implementation of their trust management framework,
uses cryptographic techniques to issue and verify credentials. Automated trust negotiation, where
trust is established between parties through the exchange of digital credentials, has also been stud-
ied extensively [69, 45]. Reputation-based trust management, which relies on feedback regarding
the previous behavior of users, is a useful alternative to credential-based trust management when
credentials are not available or not practical.
8.3.2 Online Auctions
eBay is one of the best known examples of a reputation management system for an online auction
site [2]. eBay allows buyers and sellers to rate each other after each transaction with positive (+1),
neutral (0), or negative (−1) feedback ratings. The eBay score is determined by simply adding up
the feedback ratings. The eBay scoring function is vulnerable to strategic behavior as pointed out
in [68].
8.3.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems
The prevalence of bogus content being disseminated in peer-to-peer file sharing applications has
also led to much research on reputation management systems for peer-to-peer networks. XRep
runs a polling protocol that allows peers to judge the reputations of resources as well as resource
providers [21]. EigenTrust relies on the notion of transitive trust [40]. PeerTrust includes a trust
metric that considers five features [68]. Unlike a peer-to-peer network running a single application,
an infrastructure hosting many services will potentially run many different applications with each
one having its own criteria for trust.
8.3.4 Web Services
Reputation management systems have also been developed for the problem of clients wanting to
select the most reputable Web services. Zeng et al. proposed a Web service quality model where
reputation is one of their five quality attributes considered [72]. Verity, which measures the consis-
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tency in service providers to deliver the QoS level specified in their contracts, has been proposed as
a metric to evaluate the reputation of Web services [39]. The robustness of reputation systems for
Web service selection has also been considered [52]. Unlike existing work on Web service selection,
our work looks at reputation from the perspective of services that want to avoid granting requests
to untrustworthy clients rather than helping clients select the most reputable Web services.
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
We conclude the dissertation in this final chapter. First, we offer some concluding remarks on the
problems and solutions examined in previous chapters. Next, we finish the dissertation by identifying
some possible future directions to expand on this work.
9.1 Conclusion
As our dependence on Internet-based multimedia systems continues to grow, so will the need to
protect distributed multimedia services. Perimeter defenses are required as a first line of defense,
but accountability mechanisms are also required to complement the perimeter defenses. In order
to enhance the accountability of distributed multimedia services, this dissertation has made the
following contributions:
• We have introduced and analyzed Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks, which can cause
transaction state overload on SIP proxy servers by malicious users deliberately increasing call
pickup times during call establishment. During both our analysis and experiments, we see that
increasing the call pickup times for even a relatively small fraction of calls can significantly
increase the overall amount of transaction state in the system. Furthermore, we showed that
increasing call pickup times in a fixed amount of call traffic is more effective at increasing
the overall amount of transaction state in the system compared to a similar increase in the
incoming call traffic rate without an increase in call pickup times. Our experimental results
also show that using UDP at the transport layer, which requires more processing and mem-
ory for reliable message transmission at the application layer, consumes more resources per
transaction for the JAIN SIP stack implementation compared to using TCP at the transport
layer. The default transaction timeout value in the Session Initiation Protocol that allows up
to three minutes between responses from user agent servers fundamentally enables the pos-
sible accumulation of a large number of active transactions at a SIP proxy server during a
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Ringing-based denial-of-service attack. SIP stack implementations that do not handle trans-
action state maintenance efficiently (e.g., configuring server transaction capacity too low) and
SIP proxy server deployments provisioned with little excess capacity are especially vulnerable
to Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks even with a relatively small fraction of incoming
malicious calls.
• We have proposed a family of early termination algorithms to mitigate the effects of malicious
transaction state overload on a single multimedia server. Centralized accounting through ses-
sion management on a per-transaction basis is used as the primary mechanism to implement
transaction state overload mitigation at a single server. Each early termination algorithm
monitors the duration lengths of all currently active transactions and selectively terminates
transactions according to the associated policy. All three of our algorithms were evaluated
experimentally in the context of Ringing-based denial-of-service attacks on a local testbed
with user agents and a prototype SIP proxy server, which implemented all three algorithms.
Our experimental results indicate that our adaptive early termination (AET) algorithm per-
forms better than the other two algorithms when we cannot fine tune parameters for particular
workload or server capacity. However, both basic early termination (BET) and random early
termination (RET) perform much better than leaving a proxy unprotected when their param-
eters are tuned correctly.
• We have proposed two admission control algorithms to mitigate the effects of malicious transac-
tion state overload on a multimedia server cluster. Centralized accounting at a cluster gateway
node through session management on a per-client basis is used as the primary mechanism to
implement transaction state overload mitigation for the multimedia server cluster. Each ad-
mission control algorithm makes decisions based on the transaction state usage of each external
client. The two metrics used to measure the transaction state usage of each client were the fol-
lowing: (1) number of active transactions, and (2) number of active transaction-seconds. Both
algorithms were evaluated experimentally in the context of Ringing-based denial-of-service at-
tacks on a local testbed with user agents, prototype SIP proxy cluster gateway, and prototype
SIP proxy servers. The TSAC algorithm, which relies on the number of active transactions,
protected benign calls reasonably well, especially with a relaxed value of the parameter β.
However, the TSDAC algorithm, which relies on the number of active transaction-seconds,
outperformed TSAC in most cases, especially with respect to the benign call success rate. For
mitigating the effects of transaction state overload on server clusters, our experiments indicate
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that TSDAC is the better choice.
• We have proposed a distributed accounting architecture that enables multiple servers to share
and retrieve information on their local interactions with external clients. Distributed account-
ing through session management on a per-client basis is used as the primary mechanism to
implement our accounting service. Our accounting service was implemented as an extension
to the Session Initiation Protocol.
• We have proposed a trust management framework to identify clients repeatedly sending bad
requests to a distributed multimedia service. Our trust management framework is built on top
of our distributed accounting architecture. Although our framework is general, we evaluated it
experimentally in the context of protecting a SIP-based VoIP infrastructure. Our throughput
measurements indicate that using too few trust management nodes under heavy workloads
can lead to a potential bottleneck. Our latency measurements indicate that the additional
latency involved with routing requests through our trust management service does not have
a noticeable impact from the user’s perspective on session initiation operations that typically
involve human response times requiring several seconds.
9.2 Future Work
There are several possible future directions for the Kantoku framework that we proposed in this
dissertation. Below, we consider the following ideas:
• The first possible direction is to investigate the applicability of early termination to other mul-
timedia protocols as well as other applications. For example, consider the Real Time Streaming
Protocol (RTSP) used for video streaming. In RTSP, transaction state overload might occur
when malicious users deliberately increase their video session lengths by sending PAUSE control
messages to the video server. Although transaction durations in multimedia protocols often
depend on human actions, which leads to highly variable response times, other application
areas might also benefit from early termination to prevent transaction state overload. For
example, Web application servers might terminate long-running database searches early when
under heavy load to free up resources for other transactions that might not last as long.
• Another possible direction is to perform a comprehensive study of call pickup times for the
traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), cellular phone networks, and VoIP
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networks. It would be very interesting to observe how the advent of answering machines,
mobile devices, and the Internet affect the call pickup time distributions compared to the Bell
Labs study from October 1974 [25]. However, the options for such a study would be very
limited due to proprietary and privacy concerns by phone service providers.
• One final direction is to explore how the Kantoku framework can provide protection for end
users rather than focusing only on protecting servers within a multimedia infrastructure. For
example, control messages might be sent from one user to another user via a multimedia infras-
tructure in an effort to exhaust resources at the end user device rather than the infrastructure.
One example would be instant messaging spam, which is sending unsolicited messages to end
users.
105
References
[1] Amazon web services. In http://aws.amazon.com.
[2] ebay. In http://www.ebay.com.
[3] Google app engine. In http://code.google.com/appengine/.
[4] Ibm application hosting. In http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/index.wss/offerfamily/ebhs/
a1000394.
[5] Ibm cloud computing. In http://www.ibm.com/cloud/.
[6] Illinois cloud computing testbed. In http://cloud.cs.illinois.edu.
[7] Java api for sip signaling. In https://jain-sip.dev.java.net.
[8] Java platform, standard edition. In http://java.sun.com/javase/.
[9] Planetlab. In http://www.planet-lab.org.
[10] Sipp. In http://sipp.sourceforge.net/index.html.
[11] Vonage. In http://www.vonage.com.
[12] K. Aberer and Z. Despotovic. Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system. In Confer-
ence on Information and Knowledge Management, 2001.
[13] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. Decentralized trust management. In IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, 1996.
[14] G. Camarillo and M. Garcia-Martin. The 3G IP Multimedia Subsystem: Merging the Internet
and the Cellular Worlds. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, 2004.
[15] D. Chiu and R. Jain. Analysis of the increase and decrease algorithms for congestion avoidance
in computer networks. Journal of Computer Networks and ISDN, 17(1), June 1989.
[16] B. Chun and T. Spalink. Slice creation and management. In PlanetLab Design Note 03-013,
July 2003.
[17] B. Cohen. Incentives build robustness in bittorrent. In 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-
to-Peer Systems, 2003.
[18] W. Conner, A. Iyengar, T. Mikalsen, I. Rouvellou, and K. Nahrstedt. A trust management
framework for service-oriented environments. In 18th International World Wide Web Confer-
ence, 2009.
[19] W. Conner and K. Nahrstedt. Securing peer-to-peer media streaming systems from selfish and
malicious behavior. In 4th Middleware Doctoral Symposium, 2007.
106
[20] W. Conner, K. Nahrstedt, and I. Gupta. Preventing dos attacks in peer-to-peer media streaming
systems. In 13th Annual SPIE/ACM Conference on Multimedia Computing and Networking,
2006.
[21] E. Damiani, S. D. C. di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, P. Samarati, and F. Violante. A reputation-
based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks. In ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, 2002.
[22] N. Daswani and H. Garcia-Molina. Query-flood dos attacks in gnutella. In 9th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, 2002.
[23] A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson, S. Shenker, H. Sturgis, D. Swinehart,
and D. Terry. Epidemic algorithms for replicated database maintenance. In ACM Symposium
on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1987.
[24] J. Douceur. The sybil attack. In International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2002.
[25] F. Duffy and R. Mercer. A study of network performance and customer behavior during direct-
distance-dialing call attempts in the usa. The Bell System Technical Journal, 57(1), January
1978.
[26] S. Floyd and V. Jacobson. Random early detection gateways for congestion avoidance.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(4), August 1993.
[27] Y. Fu, J. Chase, B. Chun, S. Schwab, and A. Vahdat. Sharp: an architecture for secure resource
peering. In 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2003.
[28] C. Fuchs, N. Aschenbruck, F. Leder, and P. Martini. Detecting voip based dos attacks at the
public safety answering point. In ACM Symposium on Information, Computer, and Commu-
nications Security (ASIACCS), 2008.
[29] I. Gupta, K. Birman, P. Linga, A. Demers, and R. van Renesse. Kelips: Building an efficient
and stable p2p dht through increased memory and background overhead. In International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2003.
[30] M. Gupta, P. Judge, and M. Ammar. A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks. In
International Workshop on Network and Operating Systems Support for Audio and Video, 2003.
[31] A. Haeberlen, P. Kouznetsov, and P. Druschel. Peerreview: practical accountability for dis-
tributed systems. In ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2007.
[32] M. Handley, V. Jacobson, and C. Perkins. Sdp: Session description protocol. RFC 4566, July
2006.
[33] V. Hilt and I. Widjaja. Controlling overload in networks of sip servers. In 16th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Network Protocols, 2008.
[34] M. Hines. Attackers get chatty on voip. In http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/132389/,
May 2007.
[35] J. Ioannidis and S. Bellovin. Implementing pushback: router-based defense against ddos attacks.
In Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium, 2002.
[36] H. Jiang, A. Iyengar, E. Nahum, W. Segmuller, A. Tantawi, and C. Wright. Load balancing
for sip server clusters. In IEEE INFOCOM, 2009.
[37] C. Jin, H. Wang, and K. Shin. Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed ddos
traffic. In 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2003.
107
[38] J. Jung, B. Krishnamurthy, and M. Rabinovich. Flash crowds and denial-of-service attacks:
characterization and implications for cdns web sites. In 11th International World Wide Web
Conference, 2002.
[39] S. Kalepu, S. Krishnaswamy, and S. Loke. Reputation = f(user ranking, compliance, verity).
In International Conference on Web Services, 2004.
[40] S. Kamvar, M. Schlosser, and H. Garcia-Molina. The eigentrust algorithm for reputation man-
agement in p2p networks. In International World Wide Web Conference, 2003.
[41] S. Kandula, D. Katabi, M. Jacob, , and A. Berger. Botz-4-sale: surviving organized ddos
attacks that mimic flash crowds. In Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NDSI),
2005.
[42] D. Karger, E. Lehman, F. Leighton, M. Levine, D. Lewin, and R. Panigrahy. Consistent hasing
and random trees: Distributed caching protocols for relieving hot spots on the world wide web.
In ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1997.
[43] M. Lesk. The new front line. IEEE Security and Privacy, 5(4), July/August 2007.
[44] H. Li, A. Clement, E. Wong, J. Napper, I. Roy, L. Alvisi, and M. Dahlin. Bar gossip. In
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, 2006.
[45] J. Li, N. Li, andW.Winsborough. Automated trust negotiation using cryptographic credentials.
In Twelfth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2005.
[46] N. Liebau, V. Darlagiannis, A. Mauthe, and R. Steinmetz. Token-based accounting for p2p
systems. In Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, 2005.
[47] J. Little. A proof of the queuing formula l = l w. Operations Research, 9(3), May/June 1961.
[48] D. Moore, G. Voelker, and S. Savage. Inferring internet denial-of-service activity. In 10th
USENIX Security Symposium, 2001.
[49] K. Munasinghe and A. Jamalipour. A 3gpp-ims based approach for converging next generation
mobile data networks. In IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2007.
[50] A. Nandi, T. Ngan, A. Singh, P. Druschel, and D. Wallach. Scrivener: providing incentives in
cooperative content distribution systems. In 6th International Middleware Conference, 2005.
[51] K. Park and H. Lee. On the effectiveness of route-based packet filtering for distributed dos
attack prevention in power-law internets. In ACM SIGCOMM, 2001.
[52] S. Park, L. Liu, C. Pu, M. Srivatsa, and J. Zhang. Resilient trust management for web service
integration. In International Conference on Web Services, 2005.
[53] K. Poulsen. http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9411. August 2004.
[54] B. Raghavan, K. Vishwanath, S. Ramabhadran, K. Yocum, and A. Snoeren. Cloud control
with distributed rate limiting. In SIGCOMM, 2007.
[55] B. Reynolds and D. Ghosal. Secure ip telephony using multi-layered protection. In Network
and Distributed System Symposium (NDSS), 2003.
[56] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson, R. Sparks, M. Handley,
and E. Schooler. Sip: Session initiation protocol. RFC 3261, June 2002.
[57] A. Rowstron and P. Druschel. Pastry: Scalable, decentralized object location, and routing for
large-scale peer-to-peer systems. In International Middleware Conference, 2001.
[58] H. Schulzrinne, A. Rao, and R. Lanphier. Real time streaming protocol. RFC 2326, April 1998.
108
[59] H. Schulzrinne and J. Rosenberg. A comparison of sip and h.323 for internet telephony. In
8th International Workshop on Network and Operating Systems Support for Digital Audio and
Video, 1998.
[60] H. Sengar, H. Wang, D. Wijesekera, and S. Jajodia. Fast detection of denial-of-service attacks
on ip telephony. In IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), 2006.
[61] A. Sherman, P. Lisiecki, A. Berkheimer, and J. Wein. Acms: the akamai configuration manage-
ment system. In 2nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation,
2005.
[62] M. Srivatsa, A. Iyengar, J. Yin, and L. Liu. Mitigating application-level denial of service attacks
on web servers: a client-transparent approach. ACM Transactions on the Web, 2(3), July 2008.
[63] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Liben-Nowell, D. Karger, M. Kaashoek, F. Dabek, and H. Balakrish-
nan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications. IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 11(1), February 2003.
[64] V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar, and E. Sirer. Karma: a secure economic framework for
p2p resource sharing. In Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2003.
[65] M. Walfish, M. Vutukuru, H. Balakrishnan, D. Karger, and S. Shenker. Ddos defense by offense.
In SIGCOMM, 2006.
[66] H. Wang, D. Zhang, and K. Shin. Detecting syn flooding attacks. In INFOCOM, 2002.
[67] L. Wang, K. Park, R. Pang, V. Pai, and L. Peterson. Reliability and security in the codeen
content distribution network. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2004.
[68] L. Xiong and L. Liu. Peertrust: Supporting reputation-based trust for peer-to-peer electronic
communities. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 16(7), July 2004.
[69] T. Yu, M. Winslett, and K. Seamons. Supporting structured credentials and sensitive poli-
cies through interoperable strategies for automated trust negotiation. ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security, 6(1), February 2003.
[70] A. Yumerefendi and J. Chase. The role of accountability in dependable distributed systems. In
1st Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability, 2005.
[71] G. Zacharia, A. Moukas, and P. Maes. Collaborative reputation mechanism in electronic mar-
ketplaces. In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 1999.
[72] L. Zeng, B. Benatallah, M. Dumas, J. Kalagnanam, and Q. Sheng. Quality driven web services
composition. In International World Wide Web Conference, 2003.
[73] B. Zhao, L. Huang, J. Stribling, S. Rhea, A. Joseph, and J. Kubiatowicz. Tapestry: a resilient
global-scale overlay for service deployment. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions, 22(1), January 2004.
109
Author’s Biography
William Gary Conner II received his Bachelor of Science degree from Washington University in St.
Louis, Missouri, in 2002 and his Master of Science in Computer Science degree from the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2004. Since August 2002, he has been a graduate student
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He joined the Multimedia Operating Systems
and Networking (MONET) group, which is headed by Professor Klara Nahrstedt, in 2003. His
primary research interests are security and distributed systems. In his research, he has designed and
implemented protection mechanisms to prevent denial-of-service attacks on multimedia servers.
110
